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INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with economic aspects and prob­
lems of farm leasing. Even if the analysis is performed 
only at the firm level, manifold problematic issues exist, 
such as the long term combination of resources, the sharing 
of costs and returns, and the degree of uncertainty about 
future returns. A theoretical framework for analysis of 
resource allocation and income distribution in rented farms 
has been elaborated in recent literature (15, 14, ch. 2Q, 
15, 25). This framework requires certain modifications 
and expansions to embrace current leasing problems. Em­
pirical studies of farm leases have been largely histori­
cal and descriptive rather than analytical. More empiri­
cal information is needed on the effects exerted by leas­
ing arrangements on resource use at the firm level. This 
study is undertaken for the purpose of measuring and ap­
praising the problematic areas connected with intratemporal 
dissociation between benefits and costs in a rented farm, 
thus providing further insight into the resource structure 
and operation of a firm in which multiple interests are 
present. 
Economic analysis of problems related to leasing ar­
rangements are fundamentally concerned with allocation of 
resources both within and between economic units. The 
intrafirm analysis may be divided into two main and inter­
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related areas of investigation: 1) efficiency of resource 
use, and 2) equity of income distribution between resource 
owners. The impact of the use of resources in rented farms 
goes beyond the boundaries of the firms, since intrafirm 
misallocation of resources or maldistribution of returns 
contributes to interregional or intersectoral resource mal­
adjustment. Resource owners receiving a share of total 
product greater than the productivity of their resource 
contribution, for instance, might have their income raised 
to a level where the "reservation price" for staying in ag­
riculture is met and they will be unwilling to move their 
resources into alternative employments providing greater 
productivity. 
Recent studies (14, ch. 20; 7, 25) appear to have 
achieved a satisfactory agreement in defining the functions 
of a lease, thus providing a common starting point of any 
economic analysis in the area. Chryst and Timmons (7, p. 7) 
have so summarized the purposes of farm rent: 
First, it helps allocate resources among particular 
kinds and amounts of uses in the productive process. 
Second, it distributes returns between landlord and 
tenant from the joint use of their combined resources. 
Third, farm rent helps to keep landlords and tenants 
working together as teams which is necessary in the 
continued joint use of their combined resources. 
This definition of the functions of a farm lease is 
accepted in the analysis undertaken in the present study. 
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In terms of the above functions of a lease, theoretical 
analysis will be formulated and empirical investigation 
directed. 
It is fairly safe to assume that this interpretation 
of the lease, besides providing a useful analytical circum­
scription, reflects basic purposes of landlords and tenants 
in getting together for production and distribution purposes. 
Surveys made with the objective of detecting motivation and 
criteria regulating action of landlords and tenants have 
suggested a basic acceptance by both sides of these func­
tions of the lease (38). 
A further advantage connected with precise delimitation 
of the purpose of a lease is the possibility of measuring de­
viations, whether induced by institutions or other causes, 
from optimum attainment of the function of the lease. 
Problem of Multiple Interests within a Firm 
As pointed out by Allen, "The concept of a firm is 
simple, a matter of definition; it is the effective decision-
taking unit in whatever production activity is considered" 
(1. p. 608). To this basic definition of a firm, economic 
analysis has traditionally added a set of collateral charac­
teristics in terms of which the theory of the firm, as today 
known in the literature, has been formulated. Particularly 
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relevant to the area of Inquiry with which the present study 
is concerned, is the assumed perfect association between 
input contributor and return receiver within the firm, to 
the effect that the resource owner receives the marginal 
value product of the resource he contributes. This associa­
tion is attained by assuming the existence of an entre­
preneur in whose hands are centralized the power and re­
sponsibility of decision-making. He owns or hires factors 
of production and he acts so as to attain a position of prof­
it maximization for the firm as a unity. On the basis of 
these premises a set of equilibrium conditions for the firm 
have been elaborated (24, p. 86). Lack of success in at­
taining a position of equilibrium has been attributed to 
such causes as lack of knowledge, limitations in resources 
and risk aversion. 
The complexities resulting from the schism in the de­
cision making unit or, in other words, from the existence 
of multiple interests within a firm, have not received ex­
tensive treatment in the literature. The problems con­
nected with this deviation from the assumed structure of the 
firm are undeniably relevant for the analysis of organiza­
tion and behavior of quite a large section of firms. 
This study is concerned with a particular case of firm 
organization in which multiple interests are present. With 
respect to the traditional concept of the firm in economic 
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theory, the firm resulting from the stipulation of a lease 
differs in the sense that: 1) the bundle of resources nec­
essary to carry out the productive activity of the firm is 
obtained through the contributions of two parties, namely 
landlord and tenant, and 2) the decision-making process is 
not united in the hands of the entrepreneur but variably 
divided between resource contributors.* At the time when 
the initial contributions of resources is made, an agree­
ment on the division of returns is also stipulated. Com­
plexities in the functioning of the firm are increased by 
variations in the division of decision making between two 
parties. A great' deal of variability is present in this 
area; from almost complete abstention of the landlord (cash 
lease), to an intermediate combination, whose content is 
somewhat determined through bargaining (crop-share lease), 
to a form of cooperative decision-making by both parties 
(certain livestock share leases).** 
The problems connected with this structural organi­
zation of the firm are largely engendered by conflicts be­
tween the parties of the lease. In fact ''a firm attempting 
* 
The second is the basic distinguishing feature of a 
lease. Corporations, for instance, are firms in which many 
resource owners contribute the necessary stock of factors 
of production, but the decisions about their use are still 
made by a single entrepreneurial unit. 
**This division is based on types of lease most common 
in the Midwest. However, they reflect general categories of 
leases present elsewhere. 
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to maximize profits exists from the standpoint of either 
the tenant or the landlord as a resource owner" (14, 
p. 587)** This is specifically the case of many share and 
cash leases. The landlord represents a distinct position 
from the standpoint of the use and returns from such 
specialized factors as land and buildings. The tenant re­
presents a distinct position from the standpoint of use and 
allocation of specialized resources in the form of labor 
and particular forms of capital. Thus, leases can be 
analyzed from the standpoint of either the tenant or land­
lord as a resource owner. On the other hand, in the case 
of business partnership (as in the case of certain live­
stock share leases) the landlord and tenant may view the 
same resource collection as an entity from the standpoint 
of profit maximization and resource use. 
Besides the eventual violation of the assumption of 
profit maximization for the firm as a unique entity, fur­
ther problems can be created by the existence of split 
ownership of resources and decision making. These problems 
may develop from decisions made in: 1) long-term and 2) 
short-term periods of production. 
*The term "firm" is here not very appropriate. In 
the light of the function of the lease specified above, a 
"firm" comes into existence only when the landlord and tenant 
resources are brought together. As explained later in the 
text, rather than a set of firms we have different stand­
points and goals on the firm organized through leasing. 
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Long term decisions apply to situations in which the 
lease has not yet been established and the landlord, with 
his fixed stock of resources, is looking for the tenant 
possessing the optimum amount of complementary resources ; 
the tenant, conversely, is seeking the landlord who would 
offer the optimum complement to his resources. The concept 
of optimum amount of resources differs, however, from the 
one commonly applied in the theory of the firm.* In a lease 
the optimum level of variable resources, from the stand­
point of the owner of the fixed factor, is attained when 
the marginal productivity of the variable resource is re­
duced to zero. Conflicts on the quantities of the inputs 
to be employed follow directly from this divergency. 
Decisions related to short term period of production -
once the leasing agreement has been reached and the firm, 
as a productive-distributive unit, created - may also be 
a source of deviation from the conditions which guarantee 
achievement of efficiency. For clarity of presentation, 
potential problematic situations may be divided into two 
general areas : 1) dissociation of costs and returns and 
2) limited planning horizon induced by uncertainty of 
*A more detailed treatment of leasing engendered im­
perfections is presented in the second chapter. The dis­
cussion included in the present section has the exclusive 
function of introducing and discussing in general the 
nature of the problem. 
tenure expectation. Most of the imperfections in the use 
of resources and the distribution of income stemming from 
them, have received extensive theoretical treatment in the 
literature (19, ch. 20; 30, 39). 
Even though emphasis has here been placed upon po­
tential deviations inherent in the existence of multiple 
interests within the firm, it is necessary to point out 
that several economic advantages may be attained by indi­
viduals through leasing. For instance, severe capital 
limitations of an endogenous nature can be relaxed through 
leasing. Capital limitations might cause the entrepreneur 
to plan over short periods alone, because survival of the 
firm becomes basic for farm operation. A landlord with a 
fixed stock of land resource and scarce operating capital 
may achieve, through combination with a tenant endowed 
with a stock of labor and capital, an optimum level of re­
source quantity. Conversely, the amount which would be 
used by a tenant for purchase of land is used for ac­
quiring other capital items. 
In the area of endogenous capital limitation, the 
presence of the "principle of increasing risk" suggests 
that the size of production unit might be larger under 
renting than under proprietorship. In fact, the risks 
associated with larger outlay may be spread under certain 
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types of leases, particularly share leases : "... the 
uncertainties surrounding larger operations are less under 
renting than under ownership" (14, p. 549). 
Finally, sharing of uncertainties connected with 
yields and prices may constitute an incentive for expansion 
of the size of the firm. Existence of "large" farms under 
share leases may be partly explained by the increased pro­
pensity to include greater uncertainties in the planning of 
farm operation. 
Status of Research in the Area of Tenancy 
and Purpose of the Present Study 
After the initial interest by early economists on 
the problems raised by rental contracts, research was 
oriented toward investigations largely descriptive rather 
than analytical in nature. Extensive surveys on the regu­
lations and proportions of the various forms of leases, 
mainly in the attempt to identify "typical" leasing cus­
toms, were carried out. More recently, however, emphasis 
has turned toward studies and investigations of more ana­
lytical nature. In this area particularly relevant are 
the contributions by Heady and Kurlburt (13, 20, 25). 
The trend of research seems to have followed two main 
routes: 1) exploration of the theory of the firm under 
situations with split ownership of resources and 2) empiri-
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cal analysis of the existing leasing arrangements. The 
first route attempted to establish optimum conditions for 
attaining equilibrium thus stating norms of a universal 
nature. The second has been concerned with testing the 
existing situations in terms of theoretical norms. Studies 
conducted recently along these two streams of analysis 
have been successful in : 1) determining norms (14), 2) 
indicating theoretically potential areas of inefficiency 
and inequity with respect to the established norms (12, 
13), 3) formulating optimum conditions (25), 4) identi­
fying, through empirical investigations, lack of fulfill­
ment of optimum conditions in certain geographical areas 
at specific points of time (25), and 5) comparing produc­
tivities of resources between alternative tenure arrange­
ments (20, 30). 
An existing void in the analysis of leasing is that 
related to: 1) empirical isolation for individual farms 
of eventual deviations from postulated norms, 2) compar­
ison of alternative leasing arrangements for given re­
sources restrictions on given leasing arrangement, and 
4) optimum long-run combination of landlord and tenant 
resources. The need of such an analysis derives from the 
fact that empirical investigations performed so far have 
mainly operated on samples from populations of tenure 
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classes, such as owner-operators, cash tenants and vari­
ous forms of share tenants.* They have made comparisons 
between the productivity of resources under various tenure 
and leasing arrangements, comparisons and inferences which 
have greatest significance for the levels of resources 
corresponding to the mean of the class considered and at 
one point of time. There is, however, lack of informa­
tion about the impact of typical leasing arrangements on 
intrafirm resource allocation based on an analysis of 
individual cases. This is relevant since, as hypothesized 
later on, the kinds and quantities of resources as well 
as restrictions in leases terms, play an important role 
in determining the inefficiencies connected with rental 
contracts. The inclusion in the sample of farms endowed 
with various stocks of factors of production, and capital 
in particular, and the derivation of estimates of differ­
ences in resources efficiency attributed to various ten­
ure arrangements, could give results of hybrid nature. It 
could happen, for instance, that large differences in fac­
tor productivities caused by wide disproportions between 
landlord and tenant contributions of capital could be 
partly or totally offset by cases in which resources 
* 
A particularly significant study of this type has 
been recently performed by Miller (30). As suggested by 
the author, further and more detailed knowledge about re­
source allocation within each tenure class is needed be­
fore proceeding toward significant comparisons between 
classes. 
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limitations are relatively the same for both parties and 
differences in resource productivities are non significant. 
Besides, eventual conflicts related to selection of enter­
prises and respective levels of intensity, have received 
scanty attention in the literature. 
This study is specifically concerned with 1) the 
impact of intratemporal dissociation between benefits and 
costs on resource allocation and income distribution in 
a typical crop-share-cash lease, 2) analysis of the im­
pact of alternative leasing arrangements on the initial 
collection of resource, and 3) analysis of effect of re­
laxing some resources restrictions on optimum farm plans 
and income sharing. Linear programming is the analytical 
tool employed, and the analysis of the initial situation is 
carried out for the period 1931-1955» 
Only the eventual deviations induced by intratemporal 
dissociations are taken into consideration. Intertemporal 
dissociations, problems of long term combinations of land­
lord and tenant resources, and effects of prices and yields 
variations on stability of leases are recognized but are 
not treated specifically in the empirical analysis. 
This study has the general purpose of testing empiri­
cally hypotheses which have been presented theoretically in 
the literature. Further hypotheses advanced in the follow­
ing chapter are also tested. 
Objectives of the Study 
In the light of the general purpose elaborated in the 
previous section, the objectives of this study are as fol­
lows : 
1. To isolate leasing engendered imperfections through 
intrafirm analysis of resource allocation. The emphasis 
is here essentially methodological, since the primary 
goal is to devise an analytical procedure or adapt 
available analytical tools to detect and measure tenure 
impacts on resources allocation within the firm. 
Within this general area and on the basis of the 
developed methodology the following specific objectives 
are pursued: 
(a) to point out basic bargaining conflicts be­
tween landlord and tenant for actual resource 
restrictions; 
(b) to evaluate the impact on resource allocation 
and income distribution generated by alterna­
tive leasing arrangements and alternative re­
source restrictions. 
2. To draw preliminary conclusions on the types of ad­
justments needed in farm leases and rented farms both 
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with respect to types of leases, given certain re­
sources restrictions, and on the levels of resource 
combination, given certain leasing arrangements. 
Analytical Procedure 
This study has three major phases : 1) development of 
a theoretical framework for appraisal of resource use in 
rental arrangements, 2) adaptation of linear programming 
procedure to the analysis of tenancy problematic situations, 
3) application of analytical model to selected resource and 
lease situations. 
The theoretical framework is a synthesis and organiza­
tion of relevant concepts advanced in current literature on 
leasing theory. It provides the elements necessary for the 
formulation of hypotheses to be tested in the empirical sec­
tion. 
The methodological segment of this study applies linear 
programming as an analytical tool to separate lease engender­
ed imperfections. It differs from previous studies in the 
general area of relationship between land tenure and pro­
duction economics (22, 34) in two main respects. First, 
this study endeavors to determine, besides the optimum posi­
tions for the two parties, the feasible intermediary posi­
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tions between the two optima, pointing out the possibility 
of alternative farm plans within a given lease. Second, 
instead of considering discrete changes in landlord and 
tenant capital restrictions, the modification of the linear 
programming simplex solution which allows for continuous 
variation in the operating capital, is utilized here. 
The analysis is applied to a typical rented farm in 
North Central Iowa. Lease and resource situations are de­
scribed in a following chapter. 
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THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF LEASING IMPERFEC­
TIONS AND FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES 
Recent economic literature concerned with the theoret­
ical problems raised by various forms of rental contracts 
has based the analysis on the traditional theory of the 
firm. In this approach the firm is assumed to be opera­
ting in perfectly competitive markets for both products 
and factors. One owneroperator makes decisions, bears 
the costs, and receives the returns. This type of firm 
has become the operational norm from which deviations are 
measured. The main types of rental agreements have been 
appraised and inherent imperfections pointed out. 
This chapter brings together the basic theoretical 
propositions which have thus far been advanced in the lit­
erature and points out the aspects which appear to be most 
relevant for subsequent formulation of hypotheses. 
Criteria for Evaluation of Leasing Arrangements 
The economic setting within which any lease is assumed 
to function is characterized by the following conditions: 
1) competition (abstracting from the imperfections connate 
with the lease) and private ownership of resources prevail, 
and 2) the existing price system provides the measure for 
efficiency in resource allocation. 
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The amount of variability in rental agreements is 
rather large. Bach farm situation is unique. In order 
to be able to make statements and recommendations of gen­
eral validity, it becomes necessary to use the theoreti­
cally perfect lease as a point of departure for any anal­
ysis in this area (14, Ch. 20). A perfect lease should 
bring about 1) the most efficient allocation of resources, 
and 2) an equitable division of product among the owners 
of the resources employed in production. 
As far as efficiency is concerned, the test of a 
leasing arrangement is whether it allows fulfillment of 
the conditions which are necessary for the maximization of 
profits by the individual firm (24, p. 86). The leasing 
system thus becomes inefficient if it hinders allocation of 
resources in the achievement of these necessary conditions: 
1) a combination of enterprises which will equate marginal 
returns on resources employed in production of each, 2) 
substitution of factors such that the ratio of their mar­
ginal productivities is equal to the ratio of their prices, 
3) combination of variable with fixed resources such that 
marginal returns and costs for the former are equated, and 
4) an over-all scale of operations which equates marginal 
costs and returns at a level consistent with the cost price 
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relationships and normal uncertainties of the market.* 
The guiding criterion for evaluation of the equity of 
a lease is that the return to each resource owner should 
equal the marginal value productivities of the factors he 
contributes (14, p. 589). This criterion follows directly 
from the efficiency conditions since "unless the marginal 
value product is imputed as a reward to each factor, the 
most efficient allocation of resources cannot be attained" 
(14, p. 589). 
Perfect coincidence between efficiency and equity of 
income distribution is never achieved in reality at all 
times. Even though in a competitive industry such as ag­
riculture the rental rate tends to approach the sum of 
These conditions may be stated in several alterna­
tive ways. The somewhat simplified conditions given above 
are particularly pertinent for the appraisal of leasing 
problems. The third condition is valid only for allocating 
resources within the firm in the short run period of pro­
duction. 
It should be pointed out that these conditions are 
not all fulfilled on many owner-operated farms. In other 
words, the perfect lease used as a norm does not imply 
superiority of one tenure class above others. It only 
provides conditions of general validity for the evaluation 
within any firm, regardless of the tenure type, of the ef­
ficiency with which resources are allocated and returns 
shared. 
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marginal productivities of resources in the long run, some 
differential is expected, because of risk and uncertainty 
and the time aspects of production and rental contracts. 
It is conceivable that inefficiencies might exist in 
leases which are equitable, and, conversely, that there 
can be efficiency of resource use in leases which do not 
fulfill the criterion for equity of income distribution. 
These possibilities are hypothetically illustrated in 
Figure 1. PP represents the possibility curve on which 
the leasehold firm operates ; the reduction in output with 
respect to the analogous curve PtP1 is assumed to be in­
duced by imperfections inherent in the lease arrangement. 
The point A, however, represents the equitable position 
at which the share of return for each resource owner is 
based on the marginal value productivity of his resources 
(OT1 and 01*). It is assumed now that an adjustment in 
the leasing arrangement makes possible the shift to curve 
pip*, which is supposed to be characteristic of a firm 
owning the same collection of factors of production but 
without any schism in the decision making and in the 
sharing of costs and returns. On this curve the point B 
would characterize the perfect lease, combining optimum 
Figure 1. Hypothetical illustration of relationship 
between efficiency and equity within a 
lease 
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efficiency and equity (0T", OL").* Point C would represent 
efficiency with inequity. This could be, for instance, 
the case of a cash rent which allows attainment of an equil­
ibrium position for the firm but in which the rental pay­
ment is out of line with the productivity of resources con­
tributed by the landlord. Positions involving both in­
efficiency and inequity are easily identified, as for ex­
ample, all points other than A on the PP curve. 
Because of rigidity injected by customs and traditions 
the possibility of continuous substitution between incarne 
of landlord and tenant as suggested by curves as PP or PTP*, 
is replaced in practice by a few discrete positions corres­
ponding to shares determined by current rental contracts. 
An interesting problem concerns the identification and 
measurement of the discrete levels of output and shares 
corresponding to common rental arrangements and comparison 
with position of singly operated farms. 
* 
All points composing curve P'P1 satisfy the necessary 
and stability conditions regulating the equilibrium of the 
firm. Only at B, however, are the individual shares of 
total output equivalent to the sum of the marginal produc­
tivities of the resources contributed by each party. For 
simplicity it is assumed that the total product is exhaust­
ed by the sum of the marginal products times the quanti­
ties of the respective resources. 
Imperfections inherent in current leasing arrange­
ments may be divided into those deriving from 1) the de­
termination of farm size, and 2) short term decisions. 
Problems connected with the determination of farm 
size, that is with the initial contributions of the fixed 
stocks of resources by the tenant and the landlord, are 
not treated in this study. Here only problematic areas 
connected with allocation of resources after establishment 
of the rental contract, that is only short term decisions, 
are investigated. 
Short Term Decisions in Leasing Arrangements 
Conflicts and imperfections stemming from short-term 
decisions may be divided, for clarity of presentation, 
into two categories: 1) intratemporal conflicts and 2) 
intertemporal conflicts. Both categories have received 
extensive treatment in the literature (12, 13, 23, 30, 
and 39). Their main problematic aspects are here summar­
ized and extended to allow an evaluation of the problems 
related to decisions in rented farms and thus make possi­
ble the formulation of hypotheses guiding the empirical 
phase of this study. 
Intratemporal conflicts 
Intratemporal conflicts may be discussed as 1) shar­
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ing of costs and returns, 2) sharing of enterprises, and 
3) intrafirm cost transfers. 
Sharing of costs and returns. Returns received by-
each party may not be associated with the costs contributed. 
The general effect of distortions in costs bearing and ben­
efits receiving is a deviation from the quantity of input 
which would be profitably used by the firm in absence of 
dissociation. The deviation usually takes the form of in­
put restriction by the party who is expected to contribute 
more than he receives. If through bargaining, or custom, 
or simply lack of awareness of the dissociation, the party 
in question is induced to use the optimum quantity of in­
put, the potential inefficiency is eliminated but a trans­
fer of income takes place. 
The problematic area is particularly relevant for the 
various forms of share leases. In farms operated under 
cash contracts the only relevant issue is one of equity: 
the equalization of the rental rate with the marginal pro­
ductivity of the landlord resources. 
Given the current pattern of resource contributions 
by landlord and tenants in share leases, imperfections 
stemming from sharing of costs and benefits are particular­
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ly significant for one type of resource : operating capi­
tal. Relationship between landlord and tenant contributions 
of operating capital to each enterprises and the restric­
tion in the total amount of capital imposed by each party 
is particularly relevant for understanding the nature and 
implications of current cost and benefit sharing. Land­
lord contributions of capital to crop enterprises is gener­
ally smaller than the proportion of output received. It is 
hypothesized that given the limitation in the amount of 
operating capital traditionally contributed by the landlord 
a sharing of costs equal to the sharing of benefits would 
limit severely the level of production. Particular atten­
tion is then to be devoted in empirical studies to the an­
alysis of the role of operating capital and the impact of 
its restriction on farm organization of alternative leas­
ing arrangements." 
Sharing of enterprises. The complexity of the effect 
of tenancy on resource use within the firm is increased 
when share of enterprises are considered. Vlhen two or more 
enterprises are shared differently, inducement is generated 
in both parties to allocate resources in favor of the enter­
prise from which the largest return is received. Heady (12) 
has indicated and theoretically analyzed the distortion 
from optimum combination of enterprises which is induced by 
24 
differential sharing. If market prices represent the in­
dex of consumer satisfaction and the choice-criterion for 
allocation of resources among alternative enterprises, 
differential sharing would bring about a value of produc­
tion less than the maximum attainable with the resources 
employed. 
The hypothesis has been advanced (14, 30) that differ­
ential sharing of products might be considered as an ac­
counting device to adjust for differences in the contribu­
tions (of landlords and tenants) to total costs. If dif­
ferences in costs sharing were exactly balanced off by 
differences in products sharing, leasing would not need 
to result in deviation from equilibrium of production. It 
is unlikely, however, that highly uniform sharing practices 
would suit situations divergent in resource quality and 
quantity. 
Intrafirm cost transfers. A common form of rent in 
the Midwest and elsewhere combines share and cash charac­
teristics. The typical arrangement calls for shares of 
grain crops, while cash is paid for hay and pasture.* 
Since shares of grain crops are highly rigid because of 
*In some cases cash rent is paid as a distinct rent 
on buildings. 
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custom and tradition and do not respond, within a broad 
range, to changes in price-cost relationships and methods 
of production, the landlord is likely to seek for adjust­
ment in the level of rent through modification of the cash 
rent paid on hay and pasture.* In fact, while shares of 
grain crops are basically the same over wide areas and for 
divergent resource situations, cash rent on hay and pasture 
vary considerably from $6 to |25 or more per acre. 
This arrangement, which is actually an accounting de­
vice, may induce deviation from optimum resource allocation 
since the tenant, in considering marginal costs and returns 
of each individual enterprise, is induced to consider the 
cost structure resulting from this intrafirm cost transfer, 
rather than the cost structure for the firm as a whole. 
The resulting allocation of resources will again differ 
from that which would hold under an unrestricted system of 
prices. 
Intertemporal conflicts 
Time is a relevant factor in determining use of re­
sources in rented farms. The impact of intertemporal re­
lationship is exerted through 1) limited planning hori­
*Empirical evidence on this point is presented by 
Chryst and Timmons (7). 
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zons, and 2) uncertainty of tenure.* 
Limited planning horizons. By limited planning hori­
zons is meant the situation in which decisions are made 
for known lengths of time (expected duration of occupancy) 
which fall short of optimum planning periods. Limited ten­
ure has the consequence of inducing an intertemporal allo­
cation of resources other than optimal and altering the 
nature of profitable investment (14, p. 6ll-6l6). Emphasis 
is plaved on output in early rather than later periods and, 
in absence of satisfactory form of compensation, invest­
ments involving returns forthcoming beyond the limit of 
tenure certainty, would cease to be profitable. 
Uncertainty of tenure. The length of the lease is 
finally a crucial factor in determining the pattern of re­
source allocation. Vlhen certainty about the status of 
future tenure is precarious (oral or one year leases) it 
is logical to expect the tenant to disinvest soil resources 
and concentrate on those enterprises with shorter period 
of turnover. 
*For a detailed discussion of the time relationship 
in leasing see Heady (14, Chap. 20), Toussaint (39) and 
Miller (30). Only a schematic presentation is given here, 
since a separate analysis of time relationship in leasing 
is not included in this study. 
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Some advantages seem to be related to short term 
leases. Among them are: 1) periodic reviews of perform­
ance of the tenants, and 2) readjustment of resource 
allocation to price changes. It is impossible to deter­
mine in a theoretical analysis whether the disadvantages 
brought about by tenure expectation other than optimum 
are balanced off by incentive toward greater intensity 
created by short tenure expectation. 
Hypotheses Directing the Study 
The foregoing theoretical.propositions about the im­
pact of tenancy upon resource use contain implicitly a 
host of hypotheses to be tested empirically. In the pro­
cess of scientific inquiry, hypotheses serve as guides for 
the research. The hypotheses guiding the empirical phase 
of this study are formulated on the basis of the above 
analysis within the frame of objectives specified in the 
previous chapter. They are intended to provide further 
insight into*the structure of a farm where multiple in­
terests are present and where the interests are crystal­
lized in forms regulated by custom and tradition. 
The empirical phase of this study deals exclusively 
with imperfections in leasing arrangements related to 
infratemporal allocation of resources. Within this de-
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limited area of investigation, the inquiry proceeds ac­
cording to the following steps: 1) to delineate and meas­
ure the problematic area created by infratemporal conflicts 
within the lease, 2) to identify factors relevant in 
creating the problematic gap and to investigate their be­
havior, and 3) to advance remedial propositions toward 
the elimination of the gap. 
The specific hypotheses directing the study are: 
1. Provisions for sharing costs and returns in cus­
tomary share leases are cause of inefficient infratemporal 
allocation of resources. Inefficiency is revealed through 
1) a level of profit lower than the one attainable under 
owneroperatorship, and 2) divergency between landlord's 
and tenant's optimum farm plan. 
2. The quantity of operating capital contributed by 
the landlord and the tenant is a relevant factor in deter­
mining deviations from optimum resource use within a given 
lease. The relationship between restriction in the amount 
of landlord's and tenant's capital and the sharing of costs 
and returns plays an essential role in determining the di­
vergency between the optimum farm plans associated with 
the two parties. 
3. In a lease characterized by customary sharing of 
benefits and costs, agreement between parties on resource 
29 
allocation and increase in efficiency may be obtained 
through appropriate modifications in the quantity of cap­
ital to be contributed by the landlord and the tenant. 
4. The application to a typical lease of the op­
timum conditions of sharing benefits and costs needs to 
be accompanied by a sizeable adjustment in the quantity 
of resources contributed by the two parties. 
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ANALYTICAL MODEL 
Analysis of resource use in agricultural firms gener­
ally has been carried out by means of 1) budgeting, and 2) 
production functions estimated by single or multiple equation 
models.* More recently linear programming has become avail­
able to research workers concerned with problems of efficient 
resource use at the firm level. This chapter illustrates the 
possibility of using linear programming to separate and meas­
ure inefficiency induced by Customary leases. 
Application of Linear Programming to the 
Study of Lease Engendered Imperfections 
Linear programming may be considered as an extension and 
amplification of budgeting. As such its applications in agri­
cultural economics have been devoted largely to the determina­
tion of optimum farm plans for representative farms in selec­
ted areas. In other words, linear programming has thus far 
been employed exclusively as a farm management tool in agri­
cultural economics research.** Linear programming also ap­
pears to be applicable in studying inefficiencies engendered 
by leasing arrangements. Subsequent sections deal with the 
*For an interesting comparison of the two techniques 
see Toussaint (40). 
**Illustrations of applications of linear programming 
to farm management problems may be found, among others, in 
studies by McCorkle (29), Mackie (28), Heady (18) and Sea-
graves ( 34), 
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adaptation necessary in the simplex solution for the analysis 
of leasing problems. Prior to elaborating adaptations, how­
ever, it appears necessary to restate briefly the nature, 
attributes and limitations of linear programming. 
Logic and assumptions of linear programming 
A substantial shortcoming of marginal analysis when ap­
plied to the theory of the firm lies in the impossibility 
of obtaining an accurate description of the technology of 
the firm through the traditional production function approach. 
"Alternative methods of analysis, to supplement rather than 
to replace the marginal approach, can be sought; and it is 
here that the technique of linear programming would seem to 
be particularly relevant" (1, p. 619). 
The basis of linear programming approach to the theory 
of the firm is the specification of a technology in a way 
both more specific and more detailed than the production 
functions of marginal analysis. Three basic concepts lie 
at the basis of linear programming: resources, products 
and production processes. The first two are the same as 
those made familiar by marginal analysis, but the third is 
somewhat novel. A process is one way of producing a particu­
lar product; it specifies the kind of input, the kind of out­
put and ratio of each input to the output. "... the proc­
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ess of linear programming is a more specifically defined 
concept than the production function of the marginal analy­
sis. Indeed, a production function is a family of processes 
which use the same factors and turn out the same products" 
(8, p. 15). 
Linear programming starts from the assumption that the 
firm considers only a limited number of separate technical 
processes of production. In the short-run, there may be 
only a few processes worth considering; in the longer-run, 
the number may be quite large but still finite. The main ob­
ject of linear programming is selection of the most profit­
able processes. Flexibility is introduced by the possibility 
that any one process can be used at various levels and that 
different processes can be combined, or used together, in 
various ways. 
The linear programming approach therefore appears very 
well adapted for decision-making at the firm level. It 
deals well with problems which are awkward in marginal an­
alysis, such as large changes in inputs and outputs and 
limitations on the availability of factors. 
The linear programming technique rests on a set of as­
sumptions the nature of which is here briefly summarized." 
*A detailed discussion of the assumptions is found in 
Dorfman (8). 
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Linearity. Bach process is characterized by constant 
proportions between inputs and outputs. These ratios are 
independent of the extent to which the process is used. The 
difficulty inherent in the linearity postulate is evident 
since a ratio of inputs to outputs which is logical at one 
level of output might be quite inefficient at another. Non­
linear techniques permit this assumption to be relaxed but 
the computation procedures are quite complicated. 
Divisibility. Any process can be used to any positive 
extent so long as sufficient resources are available; indi­
visibilities in production are ignored. One way of handling 
a divisibility is to compute one's results as if inputs were 
divisible, and then adjust the optimum plan so that it corre­
sponds to the nearest indivisibility. 
Additivity. The output of two activities produced 
simultaneously is always the sum of the output of the sepa­
rate activities. This assumption might not br realistic in 
the case of complementary products but the difficulty could 
be overcome through a redefinition of activities. 
ffiniteness. It is assumed that the number of processes 
available is finite. This assumption does not permit infin­
itely small substitutions along isoproduct curves. 
Limited resources. It is necessary to the linear pro­
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gramming problem that at least one resource be limiting or 
the optimum activity is used at an infinite level. This as­
sumption does not raise any difficulty, the only problem is 
a realistic choice of the limits of resource quantities. 
The linear programming technique represents a very use­
ful addition to the list of theoretical and empirical tools 
in agricultural economics. Linear programming does not elim­
inate or decrease the importance of research on farms pro­
duction functions. Pure production function research is 
needed to supply the basic input-output coefficients of the 
various animals, soil types, etc. 
Linear programming appears particularly adapted to the 
analysis of resource use in the farm unit. It allows ex­
plicit considerations of factor limitations. For relatively 
simple cases, the budgeting technique may be used to evalu­
ate the various alternative methods of production. In the 
more complex situations, the linear programming technique 
offers a tremendous advantage. 
The profit-maximizing combination of activities may be 
selected through alternative procedures, fhe simplex method 
has become the customary procedure since it can be easily 
handled, for reasonable number of activities and resource 
restriction, with the help of desk calculators. The solution 
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through the simplex method has been clearly presented else­
where and its restatement here would be superfluous.* It 
is of relevance here to describe a modification to the sim­
plex procedure which permits the selection of the optimum 
plan in a rented farm. 
Modified simplex solution to determine 
the optimum plan in a rented farm 
The basic modification consists in setting up the start­
ing matrix so that it would reflect the condition of the 
lease under analysis.** The input-output coefficients and 
the net prices are divided on the basis of the stipulated 
bearing of costs and recipience of returns. Each resource 
available to the firm, is also divided on the basis of the 
contributions by landlord and tenant. The net price row is 
divided into two rows, the first composed of the share of 
the net price of each activity going to the tenant, and the 
second composed of the landlord's shares.*** '^'he matrix so 
composed is solved according to the simplex method (3, 17)• 
*A schematic presentation of the simplex method may be 
found in works by Heady (17) and Bowlen and Heady (3)• 
**For a description of the starting matrix see Bowlen 
and Heady (3, p. 387)• 
***The net price is obtained by subtracting the cash 
expense from the gross revenue. 
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The tenant net price now is chosen as the vector to be maxi­
mized first, and the enterprise with the largest negative 
net price becomes the incoming activity in the following 
iteration. The solution proceeds until all the tenant's 
net prices become positive, which indicates that the selec­
tion of enterprises and their intensity which guarantees maxi­
mization of tenant's net returns has been attained. If at 
this point all the landlord net prices are also positive, 
this suggests that the farm plan which maximized the tenant's 
net returns also maximizes the net returns for the landlord. 
If, on the other hand, some of the landlord's net prices are 
still negative, a reorganization of the enterprises now com­
prising the plan or a modification of their level of inten­
sity would increase landlord's net returns. 
The movement from the tenant's to the landlord's opti­
mum combination of enterprises may proceed along different 
paths according to the selection of the profitable enter­
prises to be introduced in the following iterations. How­
ever, we are particularly interested in those intermediary 
positions between the two optima which form the upper bound­
ary of the feasible combinations of enterprises in the land­
lord tenant income plane. An initial approximation of the 
boundary may be obtained by introducing in every step toward 
the landlord's optimum that enterprise which involves the 
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largest increase in landlordTs income for each unit of 
tenant's income given up. However, the collection of points 
so obtained does not necessarily guarantee the circumscrip­
tion of all the feasible points between the two optima. The 
correctness of the boundary may be checked through the intro­
duction of alternative profitable enterprises in moving from 
the tenant's optimum position and in the following inter­
mediary points. This trial and error procedure explores the 
possible paths between the two optima and thus tests the 
correctness of the boundary traced previously.* 
A graphical illustration of the results of an hypotheti­
cal solution is given in Figure 2. At point A all tenant's 
net prices have become positive and the total net income at­
tached to the plan ($7,500) is shared between landlord and 
tenant in the proportion of $5,500 and #2,000 respectively. 
Points B, C, D represent incomes flowing from the plans 
specified by each intermediate position on the boundary. 
When point S has been attained, the combination of enter­
prises which yields the largest possible return going to the 
landlord has been selected. 
*In the empirical cases to which this procedure has 
been applied only few enterprises could be introduced 
profitably for the landlord when tenant's optimum was 
attained. This simplified considerably the trial and 
error check. 
Figure 2. Hypothetical illustration of conflicts 
between landlord and tenant in selecting 
the farm plan and the division of income 
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The wider the divergency between A and S the more 
likely is the lease to become a source of conflict between 
landlord and tenant. It should be pointed out, however, 
that even if the solution of the matrix leads to a unique 
point, G for example, this is not a necessary guarantee of 
achieved efficiency and equity. Point 1% for instance, 
could represent the level of total income attainable if the 
same collection of resources were employed under a different 
decision-making structure, such as single ownership or per­
fect lease. Similarly, a unique point of profit maximiza­
tion is not a guarantee of equity of income distribution 
within the firm, since the shares going to the landlord and 
the tenant may not correspond to the sum of the productivi­
ties of the respective resource contributions. 
The methodological modification described above offers 
some advantages over previous methodological approaches which 
used linear programming to analyze allocation of resources 
in rented farms (22, 34). Previous studies have appraised 
separately landlord and tenant optimum plans, suggesting the 
existence of conflicts when independent maximization of 
profit from landlord's and tenant's resources become the 
relevant goal. The adaptation of the simplex solution sug­
gested here presents the advantage of specifying landlord's 
and tenant's optimum plans when the combined resources are 
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considered in setting up the production structure of the 
firm. 
The simplex solution of linear programming with vari­
able capital restrictions (4) may also be applied in order 
to obtain some knowledge about the modification in the de­
gree of inefficiency and conflict when the quantity of cap­
ital contributed by the two parties is varied. To determine 
the tenant's capital optima the criterion for the selection 
of incoming activities is given by the ratio between tenant's 
Z • — C • m 
net nrice and tenant's capital coefficient (d. = J J1 , 
"jT 
where z. - c<0, and a. , the coefficient in the tenant 
tJ J -L J 1 
capital row, is positive). Analogously, the ratio between 
landlord's net price and landlord's capital coefficient be­
comes the criterion when landlord's capital optima are 
s ought. 
An empirical example of the proposed modification to 
the simplex solution is given in Appendix A. 
Analytical Procedure 
The empirical phase of this study is divided into two 
areas. First, the reduction in net income induced by infra­
temporal conflicts inherent in the typical lease in North 
Central Iowa is isolated and measured. Second, alternative 
leasing arrangements are tested for efficiency when operating 
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capital is allowed to vary. 
Isolation of inefficiency engendered by typical lease 
The measurement of inefficiency is performed through an 
expost analysis of resource allocation in a typical farm 
situation in North Central Iowa.* 
Isolation of inefficiency caused by intratempora1 con­
flicts within the typical crop-share-cash lease is obtained 
by programming the available quantities of resources for two 
different types of tenure arrangements. First, linear pro­
gramming is applied to an owner-operated situation; this 
situation is characterized by having complete association 
between bearing of costs and recipience of returns and per­
fect unity in the decision-making. The farm plan and the 
return associated with this situation become the norm from 
which deviations engendered by infratemporal conflicts in 
leasing are measured.** Second, a situation characterized 
by the schism in the contribution of resources and recipi­
ence of returns customary in the typical crop-share-cash 
lease is similarly programmed. The eventual difference in 
*Details on the selection of the farm, input-output 
coefficients, enterprises and leases are given in the 
following chapter. 
**Owner-operatorship as a class of tenure is not as­
sumed here as a tenure norm. It is the relationship be­
tween benefits and costs, and the decision making struc­
ture connected with owner-operatorship which are relevant 
to this study. 
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net income and farm plan between the first and second situ­
ation is due to the arrangements for infratemporal alloca­
tion of resources in the lease, since all other variables 
have remained unchanged. 
The ex-post analysis based on the above procedure is 
performed for a period of five years, from 1951 to 1955» 
A graphical illustration of the analytical procedure is 
given in Figure J. The points connected by the line A 
represent levels of returns attained by programming the re­
sources in the case of an owner-operated firm. Line B re­
presents the optimum positions attainable when resources 
are allocated according to the conditions established by the 
typical lease. However, as illustrated in the previous 
section, (Figure 2) a wide divergency may exist between 
landlord and tenant optimum plans, which would thus create 
alternative net incomes attainable each year from the lease. 
Finally, line C represents the existential situation, this 
is levels of net returns actually achieved during the same 
period by the farm under study, once yields and prices have 
been adjusted to the expectations used in programming in 
order to make the income figures comparable. 
This analytical procedure enables the isolation in 
individual farms of the reduction in efficiency caused by 
infratemporal allocation of resources in rental contracts. 
Figure 3. Hypothetical illustration of income reduc­
tion engendered by imperfections in a lease 
in infratemporal allocation of resources 
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The difference in net income between line A and line B is 
attributable to the impact of the lease on intratemporal 
allocation of resources. Coincidence of the points of 
lines A and B would indicate that a perfect leasing arrange­
ment, as far as intratemporal efficiency is concerned, has 
been adopted. The difference in net income between the 
points of lines B and C, is caused by a residual ineffi­
ciency in the sense that it is not attributable to the condi­
tions for intratemporal allocation of resources established 
by lease. It is caused by 1) intertemporal conflicts in 
the lease, 2) imperfect resource allocation due to lack of 
planning knowledge, 3) divergency between the expectation 
model assumed in this study and the one used in reality, 
and 4) non economic motivations. 
Within this analytical scheme a set of efficiency condi­
tions may be set up. A necessary condition is that the op­
timum. plans for landlord and tenant must be the same. Be­
sides this necessary condition a sufficient condition has 
also to be fulfilled: the optimum plan for each leasing 
party must be the same as the one for the owner-operator. 
With reference to Figure 3, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions are both attained when a common net income and 
farm plan are established, regardless of the form of tenure 
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and the decision making structure.* 
The ex-post analysis composing the first stage of the 
empirical investigation concerns exclusively inefficiencies 
stemming from infratemporal conflicts within the lease. 
Intertemporal dissociations of benefits and costs and their 
impact on resource allocation are not analyzed in this study. 
Abstraction from intertemporal analysis of resource alloca­
tion permits to delineate more accurately the area of in­
efficiency connected with the conditions regulating the 
infratemporal use of resources. Furthermore, it becomes 
possible to individuate the factors relevant in determining 
the area of inefficiency and to develop remedial measures. 
Therefore, the programming of resource use over the period 
in examination has been performed separately and independent­
ly for each year. 
Efficiency of alternative leases when operating 
capital is a variable restriction 
According to the contributions of resources within 
customary leasing arrangements, operating capital can be 
*This analysis is carried out in terms of "absolute" 
efficiency in the sense that one optimum position is selec­
ted as the normative goal. It must be pointed out, however, 
that problems of "relative" efficiency or suboptima, in the 
sense of selection of the position with minimum deviation 
from the norm, are relevant. Within any given lease if the 
norm is unattainable, the identification and adoption of the 
suboptimum position becomes the relevant goal. 
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varied relatively more easily than other factors of produc­
tion. 
Therefore, the modified simplex solution for linear 
programming with variable capital restrictions is applied to 
a set of alternative tenure arrangements. The situations 
considered are: 1) owner-operatorship, 2) two types of 
crop-share leases, and J>) a typical livestock-share lease. 
This final segment of the analysis has the purpose of de­
termining: 1) relationship between the capital optima when 
landlord's and tenant's net income are alternatively maxi­
mized for a given lease, and 2) relative efficiency of 
leases compared to a normative arrangement when capital is 
allowed to vary. 
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AREA 0? STUDY, RESOURCE RESTRICTIONS, 
ENTERPRISES AND LEASING ARRANGEMENTS 
Location and Farm Situation 
The farm selected for analysis is located in the 
Clarion-Webster soil association in North Central Iowa and 
specifically in Hamilton County. It was selected from those 
belonging to the Farm Business Association for which a de­
tailed account of their production history during the past 
years is available at the Department of Economics and 
Sociology. The criterion for the selection of the farm was 
its typicalness with respect to both quantity and quality 
of resources and type of rental contract.* 
The first part of the empirical analysis, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, is an ex-post comparison of the re­
source allocation and net income achieved and achievable 
when linear programming and alternative tenure arrangements 
are applied to the available bundle of resources. The ex-post 
analysis is carried out for the years 1951 through 1955* 
Table 1 summarises the quantities of restricting resources 
present in the selected farm during the period considered. 
*The quantity of resources present in the typical farm 
in the area under study was determined from the farm data 
available at the Iowa Cooperative Crop and Livestock Re­
porting Service, Des Moines, Iowa. The characteristics of 
the typical lease are described in a study by Timmons (38). 
Table 1. quantities of selected resources available in the typical farra, 
Hamilton County, 1951-1955 
Item Units 1951 1952 1952 1954 1955 
Land 
Farm size 
Tillable area 
Harvested crop 
Rotated pasture 
Operating capital 
Total 
Landlord 
Tenant 
Livestock buildings 
Hog farrowing space 
Labor 
Monthly group A 
December 
February 
Monthly group B 
March 
April 
Monthly group 0 
May 
J une 
acres 
acres 
acres 
acres 
200 
190 
168 
22 
200 
190 
166 
24 
dollars 
dollars 
dollars 
7514 
467 
7107 
7630 
462 
1168 
sq. ft. 1680 1680 
man-hours 
man-hours 
man-hours 
825 
275 
275 
825 
275 
275 
man-hours 
man-hours 
man-hours 
685 
335 
350 
6 85 
335 
350 
man-hours 
man-hours 
man-hours 
700 
350 
350 
700 
350 
350 
200 200 200 
190 190 190 
160 185 168 
30 5 22 
7103 10897 10847 
625 534 501 
6478 10413 10346 
I68O 1680 1680 
825 825 025 
275 275 275 
275 275 275 
685 685 6 85 
335 335 335 
350 350 350 
700 700 700 
350 350 ^50 
350 350 350 
Table 1. (continued) 
[tern Units 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Monthly group D man-hours 700 700 700 700 700 
July- man-hours 350 350 350 350 350 
August man-hours 350 350 350 350 350 
Monthly group El man-hours n?5 %75 075 <°75 375 
September man-hours 300 300 300 300 300 
October man-hours 300 100 300 300 300 
November man-hours 275 275 275 275 275 
Machinery available — — -• - a 0. e q u a t e 
Storage facilities — — -• - a d e q u a t e 
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Land 
The farm size is 200 acres of which 190 is tillable. 
Noncultivated acres consist of farmstead, road, drylot and 
fences. 
Buildings 
The service buildings on the farm include livestock 
housing and grain storage facilities. Grain and hay storage 
facilities are adequate to handle the production from the 
cropland. The cattle barn consists of 1176 square feet of 
building space and has the floor adapted to swine production. 
In addition to this possible area for hogs there are 504 
square feet of hog house available. Therefore, the total 
building space available for hogs is l680 square feet. 
Labor and management 
The labor supply is composed of 1) operator labor of 
260 man-hours per month from November through February and 
275 man-hours per month from March through October, plus 
2) family labor equivalent to 15 man-hours per month from 
November through February, 60 man-hours in March, 75 man-
hours per month from April through August, and 25 man-hours 
per month in September and October. Labor supplies are 
grouped, as indicated in Table 1, in units of two or three 
months each, depending on labor requirements and the time 
available to complete farming operations. Hence the labor 
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restrictions are for a certain part of the season rather 
than for the individual months. This method of aggregating 
labor supplies supposes the labor requirements within dif­
ferent time groups are relatively flexible.* 
A constant level of management is assumed to be present 
in situations involving different tenure arrangements. In 
other words, in order to be able to isolate the impact on 
resource use due exclusively to changes in organization of 
the firm, it is assumed that the level of management does 
not vary when alternative tenure arrangements are compared. 
Capital supply 
In studies using linear programming as a methodological 
technique it is customary to divide the capital used by the 
firm in the production process into two categories, 1)fixed 
capital, and 2) operating capital. Fixed capital is com­
posed of the fixed investment in machinery and buildings, 
which is present regardless of the level of output. It is 
assumed to be available in the form and quantity adequate to 
carry out production activities within the range established 
by the restrictive resources. Therefore, depreciation and 
insurance on fixed capital are handled as fixed cost, which 
Extension personnel consider the above procedure to be 
a realistic method for handling labor restrictions in their 
effect on farm plan. (22). 
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have to be subtracted from the return associated with the 
optimum, plan. 
Operating capital refers to the capital which is not 
tied up at the beginning of the production process but may 
be freely allocated among the potential enterprises. The 
capital requirements for the various enterprises include 
annual cash expenses for crop and livestock plus investment 
capital needed for equipment and breeding stock for the live­
stock enterprises. 
The levels of operating capital used in the ex-post 
analysis for the years 1951 through 1955 are given in Table 
1. The total operating capital available to the firm in 
each production year is composed of the tenant's plus the 
landlord's operating capital. Total operating capital is 
considered in programming the use of resources for a situa­
tion reflecting owneroperatorship, while landlord's and ten­
ant's operating capital are considered as two separate limita­
tions when resources are allocated under a lease contract. 
In the second phase of the empirical analysis, operating 
capital is considered as a continuous variable, adopting a 
modification to the linear programming technique developed 
recently (4). 
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Enterprises Used in Programming 
Previous linear programming studies (28, 34) have de­
termined the optimum combinations and sizes of crop and live­
stock enterprises for a typical farm in the soil area con­
sidered. Hence, since the purpose of the present study is 
to evaluate the effect of leasing arrangements on optimum 
farm planning, only a range of crop and livestock enter­
prises, proven previously to be profitable and present in 
the farm during the period considered, are included. 
Crop enterprises 
A previous study indicates that only three crop rota­
tions ordinarily enter into the most profitable farm plans 
in this soil area (28). Thus, the rotations included as 
possibilities for this study are : 1) corn-corn-soybenas 
(ccsb), 2) corn-soybeans-corn-oats-meadow (csbcom), and 3) 
corn-corn-oats-meadoiv (ccom). The meadow in the first two 
is an alfalfa-red clover-timothy mixture. Four fertiliza­
tion levels are considered for each rotation (Table 2). 
Hereafter, fertilization levels for a given rotation are 
noted by a subscript following the abbreviated form of the 
rotation (for example, ccsb^, ccom^, csbcom^). Hence, there 
are twelve crop alternatives. Crop yields for the three 
rotations at each fertilization levels are shown in Table 3. 
Table 2. Pounds per acre of available nutrients supplied by commercial fertilizer 
•for different rotations and fertilization levels for Clarion-' 'ebster 
soils3 
First Second Third Fourth 
Rotation If P K N P I: I? P K % P E 
Corn 0 0 0 15 20 10 45 50 20 75 6o 20 
Corn 0 0 0 30 no 10 50 25 20 70 30 20 
Soybeans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 
Corn 0 0 0 5 20 10 10 50 20 40 6o 20 
Soybeans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 
Corn 0 0 0 15 20 10 45 50 20 75 6o 20 
Oats 0 0 0 10 20 0 15 20 0 20 10 40 
Meadow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corn 0 0 0 5 10 10 10 50 20 40 60 20 
Corn 0 0 0 30 20 10 6o 25 20 80 30 20 
Oats 0 0 0 10 20 0 15 20 0 20 35 30 
I feadow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
aThe fertilization rates in this table :'ere furnished by the Agronomy 
Department, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. 
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Table 5, .Ssti mated crop yields per acre for various levels 
of fertilization for Clarion-" ebster soils3 
Fertilization levels 
Rotation Unit First Second Third Fourth 
Corn bu. 40 50 57 59 
Corn bu. 32 42 49 51 
Soybeans bu. 19 21 23 24 
Corn bu. 5P 65 67 6h 
Soybeans bu. 20 22 24 25 
Corn bu. 50 59 61 
vats bu. 32 30 41 43 
Meadow tons 1.9 2.2 2.4 2 . 5  
Corn bu. 58 60 67 68 
Corn bu. 43 54 57 59 
Oats bu. 32 32 41 43 
Meadow tons 1.9 2.2 
CX
J 
2.5 
8The estimated yields were furnished by the agronomy 
Department, Iowa State College, Aries, Iowa. They are based 
on the fertilization levels given in Table 2, and on the 
following assumptions : 
1) Rotations and treatments have been in effect since 
at least 1925-1930. 
2) Yields are 10-year average yield estimate for per­
iod 1951-1960 assuming normal weather conditions. 
3) Soil is typically low in phosphorus, medium in 
potassium and medium in nitrogen soil test. 
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The various levels of fertilization are included to 
determine eventual conflicts in selecting rotations and fer­
tilization levels between 1) alternative tenure arrangements 
given certain capital restrictions and 2) landlord and ten­
ant within a given lease and for variable quantities of 
operating capital. 
The customary assumption of single-valued expectation 
with respect to the input-output relationship within each 
process or enterprise is also adopted in this study. Besides 
the expectation is assumed to remain unchanged in all the 
situations considered, regardless of the tenure arrangement. 
Since the emphasis of this study is on leasing imper­
fections leading to inefficiencies in intratemporal alloca­
tion of resources, the input-output relationship in a given 
rotation is assumed to be unaffected by intertemporal re­
lationship within the lease. The theoretical connection be­
tween intratemporal and intertemporal dissociations is recog­
nized, but it is not investigated in the empirical phase of 
this study. 
Finally, out of the various possible ways of producing 
a given rotation, especially in what concerns substitutabil-
ity between machinery and labor, only one set of techniques 
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which is appropriate for the average farm of the area is 
chosen here. 
Description of cost items of each rotation and its labor 
requirements are given in Appendix B. 
Livestock: enterprises 
Two livestock enterprises are considered in planning. 
These two enterprises include the most profitable hog system 
and cattle feeding program for average conditions (28, 34). 
Dairy and poultry enterprises are not included since they 
were found to enter the optimum program infrequently and 
with only minor changes in income. 
Spring hogs. This hog system includes pigs farrowed 
in March, fed out on pasture, and marketed in November at 
the weight of' 270 pounds. Litters average 7*8 pigs weaned per 
sow but one gilt is saved back for farrowing the following 
year. Pork sold per litter, including a 400 pound sow, 
averages 2136 pounds. The death loss is estimated at five 
percent after, weaning. 
Pasture-fed steer calves. The calves are purchased in 
October and sold the following September. They are wintered 
in drylot on roughage and limited amount of grain. Feed is 
increased after the calves are put on pasture, from May to 
July, and full feeding is continued in drylot until the calves 
6o 
are finished. Initial weight is 430 pounds and market 
weight is 1000 pounds. 
Input-output data for these two livestock enterprises 
are given in Appendix C. 
Prices Used in Programming 
An expectation model based on the average prices of 
the previous years has been assumed to have been adopted by 
the entrepreneur for each year of the period considered. 
Expectation about crops prices have been obtained by consid­
ering the average of the prices occurred in the previous 10 
years, while a five years average is the assumed expecta­
tion model for livestock enterprises. 
The price expectation model has also been assumed to be 
independent of the tenure arrangement. 
Prices used in programming for the various years are 
presented in the Appendix D. 
Returns Associated with Optimum Farm Plans 
The quantities maximized in the optimum farm plans ob­
tained through linear programming are net returns. The net 
return coming from each activity, or "net price'', is obtained 
by subtracting the variable cost needed to produce one unit 
of the activity from the gross revenue. The total net return, 
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that is the sum of net revenues associated with the enter­
prises composing the plan, is therefore gross of fixed costs. 
Since fixed costs do not vary in the situations considered, 
the returns given for farm plans are comparable and may be 
used to show the difference in income between plans. 
Net taxable return for each farm plan is obtainable by 
subtracting fixed costs from net return. Tenant's profit 
could thus be computed by subtracting his fixed costs (main­
ly depreciation and insurance on machinery) from his net re­
turn; similarly landlord's profit is equal to his return 
minus his quota of fixed costs (depreciation and insurance 
on buildings and property taxes). 
Types of Leases 
Even though the central part of the empirical analysis 
concerns the typical crop-share-cash lease and its impact 
on efficiency, alternative leasing arrangements are also 
analyzed. 
The leases considered in this study are outlined in 
Table 4. The first lease is the typical arrangement in 
North Central Iowa, as pointed out in' a study by Timmons (38). 
The feature which varies more frequently in this lease is 
the amount of cash rent paid for hay land. In practice the 
cash rent varies from a minimum of #6 to a maximum of about 
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Table 4. Sharing of receipts and expenditures in leasing 
arrangements considered in the study 
Receipts and expenses 
Tenant1 s Landlord's 
Items percentage percentage 
Lease 1. Typical crop share lease 
Corn 50 50 
Soybeans b0 40 
Oats Co 40 
Fertilizer and seed 
expense3 50 50 
Operating expenses 100 0 
Real estate expenses 0 100 
labor 100 0 
Cattle and hogs (receipts 
and expenses 100 0 
Cash rent per acre of 
hay land of v6.00 
Lease 2 - Sane as Lease 1 except ol0 per acre cash rent for 
hay land 
M6 Lease 3 - Same as Lease 
hay land 
1 except per a ere cash rent for 
Lease 4 — Same as Lease 
hay land 
1 except $29 per acre cash- rent for 
Lease 5 - Modified crop-share lease 
All grain crops b 50 50 
Value of hay and pasture 50 50 
Fertilizer and seed ex­
pense 50 50 
Operating expense 50 50 
Real estate expense 0 100 
Labor 100 0 
Cattle and hogs (re­
ceipts and expense) 100 0 
aLandlord furnishes all of the grass and legume seed 
while tenant furnishes all of the seed oats. 
°It is assumed that the tenant purchases the landlord's 
share of the hay and pasture at the market price for hay. 
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Table 4. (con.tinued) 
Receipts and expenses 
T enantf s Landlord's 
Items percentage percentage 
Lease 6 - Livestock-share lease 
Livestock receipts 50 50 
Investment in livestock 
and livestock equipment 50 50 
Livestoc e xp ens e s 50 50 
Crop receipts 50 50 
Fertilizer and seed 50 50  
Operating expenses 50 50 
2eal estate expenses 0 100 
labor 100 0 
$25 per acre. In order to study the effect on efficiency of 
the change in magnitude of this type of intrafirm cost trans­
fer, leases 2, 3, and 4 are considered. They are identical 
to lease 1 except the cash rent is raised to $10, &16, and 
$29. In the last lease the cash rent is equivalent to the 
marginal return to land as derived from the optimum farm 
plan for the owner-operator. In the fifth lease the incen­
tive conditions which encourage achievement of efficient 
intratemporal allocation of resources (25, p. 86), have been 
introduced in the crop-share lease. Finally, a typical 
livestock-share lease is analyzed. 
The analysis of these leases permits the investigation 
of 1) the comparative effect on efficiency given a common 
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resource situation and price expectations, and 2) eventual 
changes in the level of efficiency and conflict between par­
ties within a lease when operating capital is introduced as 
a continuous variable. 
6j> 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
The findings of the empirical analysis are presented 
in this chapter following the division given in the analyti­
cal procedure, Chapter III. First, the results of the ex-
post analysis of resource allocation in a representative 
farm under a typical crop-share-cash lease are presented. 
Second, the impact on efficiency and equity induced by some 
modifications in the typical lease contract are analyzed. 
Third, the efficiency of alternative leases is compared when 
operating capital enters the analysis as a variable restric­
tion. 
Problematic Areas in Resource Allocation 
Engendered by a Typical Crop-share Lease 
The delimitation of problematic areas represents a nec­
essary analytical phase prior to the formulation of diagnos­
tic and remedial statements. A preliminary delimitation of 
relationships between leasing arrangements and resource ef­
ficiency, is attained through an ex-post analysis of effi­
ciency under a situation of owner-operatorship compared with 
that under a typical crop-share-cash lease. 
The ex-post analysis has been carried out for the years 
1951 through 1955. For each individual year linear program­
ming technique has been applied to the bundle of resources 
available for production in order to determine the optimum 
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farm plans under two tenure situations: 1) owner-operatorship 
and 2) typical crop-share-cash lease. The first situation 
is characterized by a complete association between benefits 
and costs, and unity in the decision-making process. The 
second situation represents the typical dissociation between 
benefits and costs and schism in decision-making. The linear 
programming technique applied to the second situation, with 
the modification described in Chapter III and Appendix A, 
leads to two alternative farm plans : 1) landlord's optimum 
farm plan, and 2) tenant's optimum farm plan. Finally, the 
farm plan actually adopted in the farm is included in the 
analysis. The net income corresponding to this situation 
has been determined by multiplying the enterprises adopted 
in the farm by their net prices obtained by using the price 
expectation model used in programming.* 
The farm plans and net income associated with these 
situations are presented in Table The levels of net in­
come are graphed in Figure 4. 
The interpretation of the results of this analysis 
leads to a series of considerations about the problematic 
relationships between leasing and resource efficiency. They 
are : 
1. A typical crop-share-cash lease is a source of in-
*See the section on prices in Chapter IV. 
Table 5* Optimum farm plans and associated returns under owner-operatorship and a typical 
crop-share-cash lease, 1951-1955 
Years 
Tenure 
situa­
tion 
Total 
returns 
(dollars) 
Landlord's 
returns 
(dollars) 
Tenant's 
returns 
(dollars) 
Rota­
tions 
(acres) 
Hogs 
(litters) 
Beef 
calves 
(head) 
limit­
ing re­
sources 
1951 Owner-opera­
tor's opti­
mum plan 6,965 168 ccsbg 19 0 
Land 
Capital 
Landlord1 s 
optimum plan 5,978 3,006 2,972 
92 ccorn^ 
76 ccsbg 21 0 
Land 
L.C.& 
Corn 
Tenant's op­
timum plan 5,871 2,868 3,003 
52 ccomi 
115 csbcomg 
20 0 Land 
L.C. 
Corn 
Actual plan 5,823 2,862 2,961 168 csbcomg 18 5 -
1952 Owner-ope ra« 
tor's opti­
mum plan 7,611 m» mm 165 ccsb^ 19 0 
Land 
Capital 
landlord1 s 
optimum plan 6,307 3,30k 3,003 
22 ccom^ 
78 ccsbg 21 0 
Land 
L.C. 
Com 
Tenant's op­
timum plan 6,307 3,30k 3,003 
22 ccom^ 
78 ccsbg 21 0 
Land 
L.C. 
Corn 
aL»,C. = Landlord's capital 
Tabla 5» (continued) 
Tenure 
situa-
Years tion 
Total 
returns 
(dollars) 
Landlord1 s 
returns 
(dollars) 
Tenant's 
retursn 
(dollars) 
Rota­
tions 
(acres) 
Hogs 
(litters) 
Beef 
calves 
(head) 
Limit­
ing re­
sources 
Actual plan 6,lii6 3.169 2.977 168 csbcomg ! 18 0 -
1953 Owner-opera­
tor's opti­
mum plan 7,578 * 169 ccsbj 17 0 
Land 
Capital 
Landlord's 
optimum plan 7,013 3,681 3,302 12 
li+7 
ccom^ 
ccsbg 
19 0 
Land 
L.C. 
T.C.b 
Tenant's op­
timum plan 6,959 3,583 3,376 
55 
105 
csbcomg 
ccsbg 20 0 
Land 
L.C. 
T.C. 
Corn 
Actual plan 6,356 3,050 3,306 160 csbcomg 15 8 -
19514 Owner-opera-
tor's opti­
mum plan 9,762 - -
93 
92 
csbcomj 
ccsbg 23 22 
Land 
Capital 
H.H.C 
Hay 
bT.C. e Tenant's capital 
CH.H» - Hog housing 
Table 5» (continued) 
Tenure Total Landlord's Tenant's Rota- Beef Lirait-
situa- returns returns returns tions Hogs calves ing re-
Years tion (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (acres) (litters)(head) sources 
Landlord's 
optimum plan 7,#9 it, 072 3,477 88 ocomi 0 33 
land 
L.C. 
Hay-
Tenant's op­
timum plan 8,66$ 3,857 it, 808 
85 csbcomg 
itO ccomg 
52 ccom^ 
6 ccsbg 
0 58 land 
L.C. 
C.H.d 
Hay-
Corn 
Actual plan 7,6h2 3,889 3,653 185 csbcomg 10 30 -
1955 Owner-opera­
tor's opti­
mum plan 10,1(52 - - 10 csbcony 2it 16 
Land 
Capital 
H.H. 
Hay-
landlord's 
optimum plan 8,013 3,787 it,226 
81 ccsbg 
88 ccom^ 1 U9 
Land 
L.C. 
Hay 
Com 
Tenant's op­
timum plan 8,009 3,761 it,22*8 80 ccomj 
16 ccomg 
72 ccsbg 
0 5it 
Land 
L.C. 
Hay 
Corn 
Actual plan 7,571 3,552 it, 019 168 csbcomg 12 20 -
dC.H» s Cattle housing 
Figure 4. Income associated with owner-operator's, 
landlord's, and tenant's optimum plans 
and actual farm plans, 1951-1955 
71 
10,500 
INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH 
OWNER-OPERATOR'S OPTIMUM PLANS 
INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH 
LANDLORD'S OPTIMUM PLANS 
INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH 
TENANT'S OPTIMUM PLANS 
INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH 
ACTUAL PLANS 
9,500 
<n 
5 8,500 
-I 
2 
UJ 
z 
o 
u 
z 
7,500 _ 
fc.SOO 
5,500 
r 
195$ 1952 1953 
YEARS 
1954 1955 
72 
efficiency in the intratemporal allocation of resources at 
the firm level. This is indicated by the discrepancy in to­
tal returns between the optimum plan of the owner-operator 
and those of the tenant and landlord. The discrepancy be­
tween levels of returns exists in every year of the period 
considered. The data contained in Table 5 thus give empiri­
cal support to the delimiting hypothesis advanced in Chapter 
II related to the existence of a degree of inefficiency en­
gendered by the typical rental contract. It is relevant to 
note that the magnitude of the income reduction is not constant 
but varies from year to year. The income associated with the 
lease, expressed as a percentage of the owner-operator income, 
varies from a maximum of 92.5 percent in 1953 to a minimum of 
77 percent in 1955* In the analytical model used the factors 
which have been allowed to vary during the period analyzed 
are: 1) prices expectations, 2) amounts of landlord's 
and tenant's operating capital, and 3) capital coefficients 
of the activities. The variation throughout the period of 
the income reduction caused by the typical crop-share-cash 
lease indicates that conflicts created by imperfections in 
the rental contract are not independent of these factors. 
This phase of the analysis thus points out the necessity of 
investigating the relationship between each of these factors 
and the presence of leasing engendered inefficiency. 
2. The results summarized in Table 5 indicate signifi­
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cantly the presence of conflict between the landlord and the 
tenant. The necessary condition for efficiency stated in 
Chapter III, which calls for identity between landlord's 
and tenant's farm plans, is fulfilled only in 1952. The 
divergency between the two plans, which can be measured in 
terms of the change of the income of each party in going 
from one optimum plan to the other, varies from year to year. 
This indicates that the conflict between the two parties of 
the lease on intratemporal use of resources are significant­
ly affected by: 1) changes in the amounts of operating cap­
ital, 2) changes in costs of enterprises expressed as 
changes in the capital coefficients, and 3) changes in the 
prices of the products expressed as changes in the shares 
of the net price of each activity.* The impact of these fac­
tors on the conflict between landlord's and tenant's produc­
tion plans needs to be investigated if a greater insight in 
the mechanics of conflicts engendered by leasing is desired, 
3. The farm plan actually adopted by the rented farm 
over this period gives some indication on how conflicts be­
tween the two parties have been solved in practice. It 
*Logically landlord-tenant conflict might be influenced 
by other factors such as contribution of factors other than 
operating capital and divergent expectation of input-output 
coefficients. In the analytical model employed in this study, 
however, these factors have been kept constant. 
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should be pointed out that this last situation has obvious­
ly been influenced by more factors than those which have 
been let to vary in the previous two situations. In fact, 
the selection of enterprises and of their level of intensity 
in reality is influenced by 1) intertemporal dissociation 
engendered by leasing, 2) difference in the price expecta­
tion model adopted in practice, 3) lack of perfect planning 
knowledge, and 4) goals other than profit maximization. 
However, some indication on the solution of bargaining be­
tween landlord and tenant in the specific farm is obtained. 
Additional insight in the mechanics of resource alloca­
tion as influenced by alternative tenure arrangements is ob­
tained by comparing the farm plans of the owner-operator, 
the landlord and the tenant as given in Table 5» The owner-
operator's optimum plans re xain relatively unchanged during 
the period. Up to 1933, with the low price expectation for 
beef cattle, hogs are the only livestock entering the plan, 
and operating capital receives greater return when used in 
fertilizing the ccsb rotation. In 1954 and 1955, with a 
higher expected price for beef cattle, it becomes convenient 
to include a rotation which increases the hay supply, such as 
csbcom. The increase in the amount of operating capital 
during the same years encourages a medium level of fertiliza­
tion in both rotations entering the plan. Land and capital 
are the limiting resources throughout the period and obvious­
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ly the change in the production plan is a function of the 
combination of enterprises which would maximize the returns 
to the limiting factors. Hog housing and hay become 1imita-
tional when the expected price of cattle increases and there 
is an increment in the availability of operating capital. 
The comparison between landlord's and tenant's optimum 
plans demonstrates how the infratemporal dissociation of 
costs and benefits resolves into conflict about the types 
and the intensities of enterprises to introduce in the plan. 
With limited capital (around *500 in each of the years con­
sidered) the landlord is unable, even under his limited 
share of cost, to contribute the amount of operating capital 
to achieve the level of fertilization which appears to be 
profitable for the owner-operator. Therefore, he would find 
it most profitable to select the rotation and the fertilizer 
level which gives him the highest return for dollar invested. 
Accordingly, the landlord's optimum programs include a por­
tion of the tillable area devoted to a ccom rotation without 
fertilization and the remaining area to ccsb with light fer­
tilization. Land and landlord's capital are the resources 
limiting the intensity of production in landlord's optimum 
program. It is interesting to note that landlord's capital 
is restrictive to the extent of letting a portion of tenant's 
capital lay disposal. This, of course, is due to the rigid­
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ity of relationship between coefficients and amounts of 
available resources implied in the linear programming solu­
tion. In practice it is likely that the tenant would use 
his disposal capital to intensify the level of production 
for rotation to the point at which the proportion that he 
receives of the marginal return to capital would equal the 
cost. 
The tenant's optimum plans, instead of the ccsb rota­
tion selected by the landlord, include a meadow rotation, 
csbcorn. This is explained by the low cash rent (per acre) 
charged on meadow and by the fact that landlord's capital 
used in producing this rotation adds more to the tenant's 
return than share in the landlord's optimum program. Also 
in tenant's optimum plans, landlord's capital is a severely 
restricting factor which ma,ces tenant's capital lay disposal. 
Proportional relationships between landlord's and tenant's 
capital seems to be an important factor in creating infra­
temporal conflicts between the two parties of the lease and 
between tenure arrangements. 
The program actually adopted in the typical farm, even 
though influenced by more factors than in the previous two 
situations, suggests some considerations of interest. The 
adoption of the csbcorn rotation throughout the five years 
indicates a predominance of the tenant in decision-making. 
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The uniformity of the rotation adopted in the actual plan 
suggests that considerations of intertemporal nature have 
influenced the determination of the farm program. The di­
vergency in the type and size of livestock enterprises be­
tween optimum and actual plans is likely due to difference 
in expectation of livestock prices and lack of planning know­
ledge. 
The considerations contained in this section have framed 
the inefficiency engendered by intratemporal allocation of 
resources in a typical crop-share-cash lease. A more ac­
curate analysis is possible by considering the marginal re­
turns to factors under the alternative optimum plans. 
Marginal returns to restrictive resources 
The price of resources is the allocative criterion not 
only in formal economic theory but also in linear programming. 
The principle of "opportunity cost" lies at the root of lin­
ear programming which is essentially based on an enumeration 
of the opportunities available for the use of a given set of 
resources. Even though linear programming seems to arrive 
at an optimum allocation without recourse to the concept of 
price, actually a problem of pricing or valuation is implicit 
in the linear programming solution. This problem of ascrib­
ing values to the services of several resources separately 
is of particular significance for the traditional firm when­
ever a great enough time-horizon of decision permits adjust­
ments in the holdings of durable capital equipment. The 
question of which types of resources should be acquired and 
which should be disposed of can be answered only by comparing 
the value of the contribution of each resource to net revenue 
with its acquisition cost or disposal price. In the firm in 
which multiple interests are present and the bundle of re­
sources available for production is obtained through the con­
tribution of two parties, the problem of valuation of re­
sources is particularly important. In fact, besides the de­
termination of the quantity of each resource, the quota con­
tributed by each party is of crucial significance. The ascrip­
tion of value to the quantities of resources contributed by 
each party is a necessary step in the determination of mal­
adjustments in resource contributions which necessarily re­
sult in a decrease of efficiency. 
A linear programming solution imputes prices to the 
restrictive resources. In the simplex solution the optimum 
plan has been determined when all the elements of the "mar­
ginal revenue" row have become positive or zero. The entries 
in the "marginal revenue" row which are associated with re­
source disposal activities are the imputed prices per unit 
of the potential restricting resources. The factors which 
are restrictive in the final plan possess a marginal return 
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greater than zero while the disposal factors are free goods 
and their price equals zero. These values when multiplied 
by the quantities of factors employed, account for the total 
return resulting from the optimum plan.* 
In the modified simplex solution used in this study the 
net price row is divided into two rows, the landlord's and 
the tenant's,** When the optimum plan is reached for either 
the landlord or the tenant, the solution imputes the con­
tribution of each resource to the net income of the two par­
ties. It is thus possible to determine, in comparing land­
lord's and tenant's optimum plan with the owner-operator, the 
changes in marginal returns to restricting resources induced 
by leasing. In addition, comparison between landlord's and 
tenant's optimum plans and related marginal returns from fac­
tors to each party provides a useful insight in the structur­
al distribution of returns to landlord and tenant as a func­
tion of the lease and of the proportion in resource contribu­
tion. 
*Some authors (2, 29) stress the similarity between the 
returns to factors obtained through linear programming and 
the marginal value products of traditional economic theory. 
It should be pointed out that the analogy is more apparent 
than substantial. In fact "the marginal concept cannot be 
applied to a situation where a change in the quantities of 
an individual factor requires revision of the entire produc­
tion plan, as in the case where the linear programming ap­
plies" (8, p. 47). 
**ïor an illustration of the modified simplex solution 
see Appendix A. 
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Table 6 presents the marginal returns to restrictive 
resources associated with owner-operator's optimum plans 
during the period under analysis. The marginal returns to 
restrictive factors from both landlord's and tenant's op­
timum plans during the same years are presented in Table 7» 
A comparison between the returns to factors in the two 
tenure situations shows a more efficient utilization of the 
limiting resources in the owner-operator plan. The complete 
association between benefits and costs allows a full utili­
zation of the supply of operating capital. Land and capital 
are the restricting resources throughout the period. In 
1954 and 1955 the larger amount of capital available (see 
Table 1) reduces the marginal returns to capital with re­
spect to the previous years, but the return to land, which 
can be viewed as the fixed factor to which capital is applied, 
is correspondingly increased. 
A comparison of marginal returns to factors between 
landlord's and tenant's optimum plans illustrates the dis­
tortion induced by the pattern of resource contribution and 
sharing of returns by the two parties in a typical crop-share-
cash lease. Landlord's capital is highly restrictive, its 
marginal return being as high as #2.44 (in 1952). Tenant's 
capital, on the other hand, because of the limitation in 
81 
Table 6. Marginal returns to restrictive resources in the 
owner-operator's optimum plans, 1951-1955, 
dollars^ 
Items 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Marginal return to 
land 13.36 20.83 24.51 29.88 28.86 
Marginal return to 
capital .62 .54 .50 .37 .36 
Marginal return to 
hog housing 0 0 0 .04 .77 
Marginal return to 
hay 0 0 0 11.45 11.08 
^Resources disposal throughout the period have not 
been included in the table since in the programming solu­
tion a marginal return equal to zero is imparted to them. 
The quantities of disposal resources is given in Table 8. 
landlord's capital, which is a necessary complement in all 
the crop enterprises, lies idle and has a marginal return 
equal to zero. The conflicts in resource use between land­
lord and tenant thus concern chiefly the allocation of 
landlord's capital as suggested by the change in marginal 
return to this resource when reallocated from landlord's 
to tenant's optimum plan. 
The conflicts over the allocation of landlord's capi­
tal effects the return to land, which in every year is lower 
than the return received by land under owner-operatorship. 
The allocation of land, also a restricting resource during 
Table 7. Marginal returns to restrictive resources in landlord's and tenant's optimum plan 
In a typical crop-share-cash lease, 1951-1955» dollars3. 
Items 1951 1952 1953 195U 1955 
Landlord's optimum plan 
Marginal return to landlord from land Ik.81 15.32 16.11 16.83 16.71 
Marginal return to tenant from land 12.21 11.28 -It. 10 28.36 19.21 
Marginal return to landlord from landlord's capital 1.11 1.6b 1.76 1.79 1.95 
Marginal return to tenant from landlord's capital 1.97 2.1*1* 1.50 -3.93 1.1*7 
Marginal return to landlord from tenant's capital 0 0 0 0 0 
Marginal return to tenant from tenant's capital 0 0 .ii9 0 0 
Marginal return to landlord from hay- 0 0 0 0 0 
Marginal return to tenant from hay- 0 0 0 3*4.88 6.1*1* 
Marginal return to landlord from corn 0 0 0 0 0 
Marginal return to tenant from corn .77 .67 0 0 .89 
Tenant's optimum plan 
Marginal return to landlord from land 15.80 15.32 -1.18 16.96 18.35 
Marginal return to tenant from land 11.99 11.28 1.56 Ik.76 17.85 
Marginal return to landlord from landlord's capital .145 1.61* -1.11 .80 .91* 
Marginal return to tenant from landlord's capital 2.11 2.1|l4 •1<3 2.03 2.31 
Marginal return to laidlord from tenant's capital 0 0 .72 0 0 
Marginal return to tenant from tenant's capital 0 0 .1*6 0 0 
Marginal return to landlord from corn 0 0 -.93 —.21* —.16 
Marginal return to tenant from com .77 .67 .01» .67 1.02 
Marginal return to landlord from hay- 0 0 0 5.00 5.13 
Marginal return to tenant from hay 0 0 0 3.1*6 2.21 
^Resources disposal throughout the period have not been included in the table since in the 
programming solution a marginal return equal to zero is imputed to them. The quantities of dis­
posal resources is given in Table 8. 
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the whole period, is analogously an element of conflict 
between the two parties. The degree of conflict over the 
allocation of land among potential enterprises might become 
so great that one party would be better off to have less 
land if it were to be allocated to maximize the profit of 
the other. In 1953, for example, the allocation of land to 
maximize landlord's profit is so sub-optimum for the tenant 
that planting the last eight acres actually reduced the total 
income of the tenant. The inverse occurs if the tenant's 
optimum plan is established. Between the two plans there 
may be intermediate plans in which returns from land to 
both landlord and tenant are positive and in which the total 
return is greater than that associated with the optimum plan 
for either party (see Table 9)• 
The quantities of resources which have remained par­
tially or totally unutilized in the alternative optimum pro­
grams are presented in Table 8.* This table is, in a sense, 
a counterpart of the table containing the marginal returns. 
From an analysis of both tables useful suggestions can be 
*Disposal resources refer only to the amount of resourc­
es left unutilized by the enterprises considered in program­
ming. This does not exclude that the use of these resources 
could be increased in activities here not considered. For 
example, labor is likely to be employed in activities such 
as fence repairing, land improvements, maintenance of build­
ings and machinery. 
Table 8. Comparison between quantities of disposal resources associated mth 
owner-operator's, landlord's and tenant's optimum plans, 1951-1955 
Disposal resources 
Optimum 
Years plan 
Tenant Hog 
capital housing 
(dollars)(sq.ft.) A 
Labor (man 
B C 
hours) 
D E 
Hay 
(tons) 
Corn 
(bushels) 
1951 Owner-op. 0 369 697 410 202 507 188 24 4040 
Landlord 897 180 690 391 217 355 286 65 0 
Tenant 140? 267 648 398 330 365 449 100 0 
1952 Owner-op. 0 325 693 407 205 506 191 26 3886 
Landlord 1137 197 692 394 222 362 291 67 0 
Tenant 1137 197 692 394 222 362 291 67 0 
1953 Owner-op. 0 514 709 433 230 321 229 44 3994 
Landlord 0 508 696 410 224 488 228 48 0 
Tenant 0 262 671 403 273 482 300 64 0 
1954 Owner-op. 0 0 621 330 118 399 121 0 2316 
Landlord 3152 1680 680 465 81 269 259 0 0 
Tenant 143 1680 562 394 39 98 327 0 0 
1955 Owner-op. 0 0 619 328 120 408 121 0 2546 
Landlord 563 1567 621 421 37 199 24? 0 0 
Tenant 250 1680 614 421 21 l66 255 0 0 
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derived in connection with the size of the categories of 
resources. Given the technique of producing the enter­
prises which has been assumed in this study - that is, given 
the assumed substitution between labor and machinery - the 
amount of labor available appears to be out of proportion 
with the other resources, particularly land and operating 
capital. In fact, in the plans corresponding to the two 
alternative tenure situations, all the labor groups in every 
year present disposal quantities. This indicates that level 
of output at which land and capital become limiting factors 
is too low to allow a full utilization of the labor supply 
within the farm. An interfirm reallocation of resources 
could thus lead to greater efficiency. The landlord would 
not become worse off in associating with a tenant owning 
the same amount of capital and a smaller amount of labor.* 
The present tenant, on the other hand, would gain by as­
sociating with a landlord provided with larger amount of 
land and capital.** 
*The amount of labor needed for the optimum plans may 
be obtained by subtracting the disposal quantity of labor 
in each group (Table 9) from the quantity initially avail­
able ( Table 1). 
**Although the problem of interfirm resource alloca­
tion is beyond the scope of this study, it is relevant to 
point out that the study of resource contribution within a 
lease could lead to interesting suggestions pertinent to 
the area of interindustry allocation of resources. 
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Conflicts between landlord's and tenant's 
optimum plans 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for optimum re­
source allocation within a rented farm have been expressed 
in the methodological chapter. In the previous section of 
this chapter it has been shown that in the typical crop-
share lease applied to the selected quantities of resources 
and input-output relationships, the sufficient condition 
(identity of rented farm plan with owner-operated farm plan) 
was not fulfilled during the period under analysis. To 
complete the ex-post analysis of resource allocation in a 
typical rented farm it is relevant to investigate the devia­
tions from the necessary condition for efficiency (identity 
between landlord's and tenant's programs). 
The net income associated with landlord's, tenant's 
and intermediate farm plans are summarized in Table 9. 
Intermediate farm plans are those corresponding to itera­
tions in the simplex solution between the two optima and 
which constitute the upper boundary of the feasible com­
binations of enterprises in the landlord-tenant income plan.* 
The data are graphed in Figure 5* As shown in the 
graphical presentation of the data, landlord-tenant conflicts 
*See Chapter III for the procedure used in selecting 
the intermediate plans. 
Table 9» Landlord's, tenant's and total income associated with alternative farm programs 
between tenant's and landlord's optimum plans, 1951-1955, in dollars 
First Second Third Fourth Change from 
Tenant's inter­ inter­ inter­ inter­ landlord' s tenant's to 
optimum mediate mediate mediate mediate optimum landlord's 
plan plan plan plan plan plan plan 
1951 
landlord's income 2869 - - - 3007 138 
Tenant's income 3003 - - - 2972 -31 
Total 5872 - - - 5979 107 
1952 
Landlord's income 3305 - - - » 3305 0 
Tenant's income 330ii - - - - 3301, 0 
Total 6609 - - - - 6609 0 
1953 
landlord's income 3583 3599 3657 - - 3681 98 
Tenant's income 3376 3375 3362 - - 3332 -1*1, 
Total #59 697k 7019 - - 7013 52, 
195k 
Landlord's income 3857 3876 3892 3971 2*071 2*0 72 215 
Tenant's income 1+808 14791* 1,759 1+1+87 1,016 31*77 -1331 
Total 8665 8670 8651 81,58 8087 7599 -1116 
1955 
Landlord's income 3761 - - *» - 3787 26 
Tenant's income 1,21,8 - - - - 1*226 -22 
Total 8009 - - - - 8013 h 
Figure 5. Landlord-tenant income possibility curves, 
1951-1955 
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on intratemporal allocation of resources may actually fit 
into three general cases: 1) identity of plans of the two 
parties (as in 1952), 2) two alternative positions only, 
landlord's and tenant's optima (as in 1951 and 1955), and 
3) the two optima separated by a series of intermediate 
plans, which generate an income possibility curve (as in 
1953 and 1954). 
For 1952 the adoption of a farm plan is not a source 
of conflict between landlord and tenant since a common 
plan maximizes the return of both parties. This, however, 
does not indicate that an efficient allocation of resources 
has been achieved since coincidence between total net income 
of owner-operator and rented situations is not guaranteed. 
In 1952 identity of farm plans between the landlord and the 
tenant existed (see Table 9 and Figure 5) but a sizeable 
gap between owner-operatorship and rented situation was 
present (see Table 5 and Figure 4). 
The conflict between two alternative optimum plans 
(as in 1951 and 1955) could be solved in most instances 
through compensation. This could be the cases when the 
movement from one optimum to the other implies an increase 
in total net income large enough to compensate the party 
whose plan is being abandoned so not to leave him worse off 
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and at the same time increase the net income of the party 
whose plan is being adopted. In both years the increase in 
total net income which accompanies the adoption of landlord's 
optimum program is large enough to permit compensation of 
the tenant. The conflict is less easily reconciled, however, 
when the increase in one party's income is equal to the de­
crease in the other party's income. 
In 1953 and 1954 intermediate farm plans between the 
two optima become feasible and the selection of the program 
is therefore likely to be based on the bargaining strength 
of the two parties. 
The ex-post analysis of resource allocation in the typi­
cal crop-share-cash lease reads to the conclusion that the 
area of conflict between landlord and tenant engendered by 
infratemporal imperfections in the lease is not of constant 
magnitude but varies considerably from year to year. As 
indicated by the data in Table 9, landlord's and tenant's 
positions are responsive to changes'in such factors as ex­
pected prices of products, changes in the amount of contribu­
tion of operating capital and other resources, and changes 
in the capital coefficients of the enterprises. These fac­
tors, as mentioned previously, have been allowed to vary dur­
ing the analysis and this explains the divergency between the 
income of individual years as presented in Figure 5* 
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This phase of the analysis has been chiefly methodolo­
gical in the sense of establishing a procedure to measure 
intrafirm inefficiency engendered by tenure arrangements. 
With reference to the area of infratemporal resource alloca­
tion in a typical crop-share-cash lease the suggested method­
ological procedure has indicated the presence and delimited 
the magnitude of inefficiency over the period under analysis. 
In addition, factors which seem to affect significantly the 
pattern of resource allocation within the lease have been 
pointed out but an analysis of more specific and diagnostic 
nature, which would allow only one factor to vary at the time, 
is necessary in order to determine more precisely the indivi­
dual impact of these factors on efficiency of resource use 
and distribution of income. 
Alternative Levels of Cash Rent on Hay and Their 
Impact on Resource Use and Income Distribution 
Variations in the typical crop-share lease considered 
in the previous section are commonly introduced by changing 
the amount of cash rent paid per acre on meadow and permanent 
pasture. As pointed out in the theoretical analysis: 
Since share rents are deeply imbedded in custom 
(shares tend to remain as a fixed percentage over 
long periods of time even though price/cost ratios 
or the techniques of production fluctuates widely), 
some landlords feel that cash rent provides a mech­
anism whereby rents can be made equitable, (14, p. 6l6). 
93 
If it appears that a higher share on grain crops may be in 
order, the cash rent for hay or pasture or buildings can be 
increased instead. But, as suggested in the theoretical 
analysis, cash rent represents an intrafira "bookkeeping" 
which distorts the cost structure of some enterprises with­
in the farm and becomes a cause of inter-enterprise cost 
transfer and, eventually, of inefficiency. 
The analysis has been performed by programming under 
alternative levels of cash rent the bundle of resources avail­
able for production in the typical farm in 1955 and with price 
expectations and cost coefficients of that year. The differ­
ent cash rent was the only varied element between the pro­
grammed situations. Four cash rents were considered: §6, 
£l0, lé, and L;.29 per acre. The first corresponds to the 
rent paid in the situation previously analyzed for the years 
1951-1955 ; the second and the third are levels of cash rent 
commonly paid in North Central Iowa (38, p. 115); the last 
is equal to the marginal return to land associated with 
owner-operator's optimum plan for the year under analysis. 
The results of the programmed sol, ions are summarized 
in Table 10 and presented graphically in Figure 6. Three 
main effects appear to be connected with the increase in 
the cash rent on hay: 1) proportional reallocation of total 
return in favor of the landlord, 2) decrease in efficiency 
Table 10. Earm plans and associated income for a typical crop-share lease in the different 
levels of cash rent on hay, 1955 
Total net Landlord's Tenant's Limit-
income net income net income Rotations Hogs Calves ing re-
(dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (acres) (litters)(no.) sources 
Cash rent on hay $6 
Tenant's optimum plan 8,009 3,761 It, 21*8 80 ccomj 
16 ccomg 
72 ccsbg 
Landlord's optimum plan 8,013 3,787 It,226 81 ccsbg 
88 ccoiiu 
Cash rent on hay $10 
Tenant's optimum plan 7,821 3,872 3»9h9 Qh ccom^ 
Landlord's optimum plan 7,573 3,873 3,700 8lt ccom^ 
81 ccsbg 
21 
514 
li8 
k9 
0 
Land 
Landlord's 
capital 
Hay 
Corn 
Land 
Landlord's 
capital 
Hay 
Com 
land 
Landlord's 
capital 
Hay 
Corn 
land 
Landlord's 
capital 
Hay 
Corn 
Table 10* (continued) 
Total net landlord's Tenant's Limit-
income net income net income Rotations Hogs Calves ing re-
(dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (acres) (litters) (no.) sources 
Gash rent on hay #16 
Tenant's optimum plan 7*523 
First intermediate plan 7,535 
Second intermediate plan 7,386 
Landlord's optimum plan 7,375 
3,989 
it, 002 
It, 010 
it,010 
3,53b 
3,376 
3,365 
80 ccom-t 
81 ccsbg 
3 ccsbj 
3,533 8ii ccom, 2 
81 ccsbg 
120 ccom-L it 
it5 ccsbj 
120 ccom^ 22 
it5 ccsbj 
itB 
lt8 
it6 
land 
landlord1 s 
capital 
Tenant1 s 
capital 
Hay 
Com 
Land 
Landlord's 
capital 
Tenant's 
capital 
Com 
Land 
Landlord's 
capital 
Tenant's 
capital 
Com 
Land 
Landlord1 s 
capital 
Corn 
Table 10* (continued) 
Total net landlord's Tenant's Limit-
income net income net income Rotations Hogs Calves ing re-
(dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (acres) (litters)(no.) sources 
Cash rent on hay $29 
Tenant's optimum plan 7,178 3,739 3,1)39 105 ccsb1 18 0 
First intermediate plan 7fk2k 2j,066 3,358 8ii ccom^ 21 0 
81 ccsbg 
Land 
Landlord's 
capital 
land 
landlord's 
capital 
Com 
Second intermediate plan 7,271 It, 102 3,169 120 ccom1 22 0 land 
Landlord's 
capital 
Corn 
Landlord's optimum plan 7,075 k,129 2f9k6 56 ccom, 23 0 
112 CCOTOg 
Land 
landlord's 
capital . 
Corn 
Figure 6. Landlord-tenant income possibility curves 
for alternative cash rents on hay in a 
typical crop-share-cash lease 
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expressed as a progressive decrease in total return, and 3) 
increase in conflicts between the landlord and the tenant on 
the selection of the farm plan, indicated by the increase 
of intermediate plans between the two optima when the cash 
rent is progressively increased. 
When the cash rent is six dollars per acre the conflict 
between landlord and tenant is a minor one, concerning the 
levels of the rotations composing the plan. Given the low 
level of cash rent, the tenant prefers to allocate to a 
meadow rotation a portion of the tillable area larger than 
the one optimum for the landlord, who prefers a more inten­
sive application of the corn-corn-soybeans rotation. The 
landlord's plan appears to be slightly more profitable than 
the tenant's plan. 
When the cash rent is raised to #10 per acre the main 
impact, particularly between landlord's and tenant's optimum 
plan, is of a reduction in efficiency rather than a redis­
tribution of income. The tenant's optimum plan is in total 
more advantageous and compensation could be easily applied. 
When cash rent is raised to §16 and $29 per acre, both 
reduction in efficiency and transfer of income seem to occur. 
Besides, the conflicts between the two parties on the selec­
tion of the farm plan become more acute. The meadow rotations 
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lose their profitableness for the tenant while becoming 
highly remunerative for the landlord. The intermediate 
plans, combining both preferences, bear returns higher than 
the extreme plans. Their total income, however, is consider­
ably lower than the one characterizing the most convenient 
farm plan when the cash rent on hay is smaller. A reduction 
iri." total return of $589 is suffered in moving from the most 
profitable plan associated with a cash rent of six dollars 
to the one associated with $29 per acre cash rent. 
The empirical evidence obtained through this analysis 
permits to conclude that cash rent on hay, viewed as a meas­
ure of income redistribution between the parties of the lease, 
exerts a deleterious impact on the efficiency of resource al­
location. Inter-enterprise cost transfers engendered by the 
distortion in cost structure associated with the payment of 
cash rent on hay reduce considerably the possibility of 
achieving an efficient allocation of resources within the 
farm. It is therefore advisable to adapt other measures in 
order to achieve the desired income transfer between the par­
ties and maintain efficiency. 
Efficiencies of Alternative Leases when 
Operating Capital Is a Variable Restriction 
The existence of inefficiency in infratemporal re­
source use and some of the factors influencing the landlord-
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tenant conflicts on resource use in a typical crop-share 
lease were pointed out as a result of the previous phase of 
the empirical analysis. The total amount of operating cap­
ital and the portions contributed by each party appeared to 
be relevant elements in determining the level of efficiency 
achievable in the selected farm. Analysis is now directed 
to: 1) comparing the efficiencies of alternative leases, 
and 2) determining for each lease the optimum levels of 
operating capital to be contributed by each party. 
The allocation of resources and the return obtained 
under a situation of owner-operatorship is also assumed here 
to be the norm with which alternative arrangements are com­
pared. The leases whose efficiency is measured and compared 
are : 1) the typical crop-share-cash lease (£6 of rent on 
hay), 2) a crop-share lease modified on the basis of the 
incentive conditions for intratemporal efficiency, and 3) 
a typical livestock-share lease.* The analysis is performed 
by applying to each of these situations the modification to 
the linear programming technique whereby the optimum farm 
organization can be determined with one resource as a contin­
uous variable, while all others are held constant.** 
*A description of these leases is found in Chapter 17. 
**This modification to the simplex solution is described 
in an article by Candler (4)„ The adaptation of this method 
to the present study is summarized in the Appendix A. 
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Operating capital is here the resource which is allowed to 
vary. The programming technique is applied to the bundle of 
resources, available for production in the selected farm and 
with price expectations for the year 1955* 
Optimum farm plans under owner-operatorship 
The farm plans resulting from the programming solution 
for an owneroperated situation when capital is allowed to vary 
are presented in Table 11 and graphed in Figure 7• All plans 
representing "corner" points are included to indicate the cap­
ital level at which the farm plan changes because, a resource 
other than operating capital becomes restricting. In the 
graphical presentation of the results, the total distance to 
the uppermost line, or the points P^(i = 1 Co 9), represents 
the total returns (on the vertical axis) associated with the 
amount of capital indicated on the horizontal axis. The 
total returns are divided into the portions contributed by 
the enterprises comprising the plan. For example, at the 
total returns are made up of hogs and crop returns and amount 
to §9,580. Of this amount ^6,720 is credited to the rotation 
enterprise and the remainder contributed by the hogs enter­
prise. Point P represents maximum profits from fixed re-
ë 
sources other than capital; the amount of capital (|15,205) 
used at this point defines the magnitude where capital is 
uniimiting. 
Table 11. Optimum farm plans under owner-operatorship, 1955 
Farm plans 
& capital 
optima 
Operating 
capital 
(dollars) 
Total 
return 
(dollars) 
Rotations 
(acres) 
Hogs 
(litters) 
Calves 
(no.) 
Limiting 
resources 
1 2,950 14,535 168 csbcom-^ 0 0 Capital 
Land 
2 3,1*60 5,1514 168 csbcomg 0 0 Capital 
Land 
3 lt,ii20 6/)b7 168 ccsbg 0 0 Capital 
land 
h 5,2l»7 6.720 l68ccsbj 0 0 Capital 
Land 
5 9,016 9,580 168 ccsb^ 21» 0 Capital 
Land 
H.H.a 
6 10,601 10,361» 168 ccsb^ 21» 13 Cap ital 
Land 
H.H. 
Hay-
7 114,158 11,633 1»2 ccsb^ 
126 csbcorn^ 
21» 5o Capital 
Land 
H.H. 
Hay-
Corn 
aH.H. s Hog housing 
Table 11* (continued) 
Farm plans Operating Total Rotations 
& capital capital return Hogs Calves Limiting 
optima (dollars) (dollars) (acres) (litters) (no.) resources 
35,000 11,823 30 ccsb, 2k 58 Capital 
56 ccomj Land 
80 csbcorn^ H.H. 
Hay 
Com 
May-June labor 
15,205 11,861 30 ccsb^ 2k 58 Capital 
56 ccom^ Land 
80 csbcom^ H.H. 
Hay 
Com 
May-June labor 
Figure 7. Optimum farm plans for an ovmer-operator under variable 
capital restrictions 
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Under the assumed level of management and price expec­
tations crop have investment priority at low levels of cap­
itals. Up to 247 (P4) it appears more convenient to in­
vest in rotations increasing gradually their level of fer­
tilization. After livestock enterprises become profitable 
and their proportion of total returns becomes increasingly 
greater as the point at which capital is not limiting is ap­
proached. At high levels of operating capital pasture-fed 
calves enters the farm plan as the most profitable enterprise 
and this induces a modification in the type of rotations in 
order to meet the forage requirements for the increased num­
ber of livestock. 
The farm plans at the various capital levels represent 
the profit-maximizing plans for a situation of perfect assoc­
iation within the farm between benefits and costs and of 
unity in the decision making process. Thus they constitute 
the norm to be achieved under alternative tenure arrangements 
and specifically, alternative leases. 
Optimum farm plans under a typical 
crop-share-cash lease 
The optimum farm plans with variable capital have been 
computed for both the landlord's and the tenant's profit-
maximizing programs. The ratio between net price and the 
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capital coefficient of the party whose returns are maximized 
becomes the criterion to determine the enterprise to intro­
duce in the plan. The comparison between the optimum farm 
plans associated with maximization of returns for the land­
lord and the tenant provides useful insight on: 1) the agree­
ment between the two parties at each capital level, and 2) a 
comparison with capital levels and total returns under owner-
operatorship. 
Tenant's optimum farm plans under a typical crop-share-
cash lease are summarized in Table 12 and shown graphically 
in Figure 8. Table 13 and Figure 9 contain landlord's opti­
mum plans and associated levels of capital. 
A omparative analysis of the two situations shows clearly 
the relevant role played by the total amount of operating cap­
ital and the quotas contributed by each party in the efficient 
use of the fixed bundle of resources. Tenant's optimum plans, 
given the division of crops specified by the typical lease, 
shows a priority of investment in livestock enterprises even 
at low capital levels. This is in contrast with the typical 
situation in soils such as the Clarion-Webster where optimum 
farm plans call for capital use in crops before livestock. 
The first capital optimum under tenant's optimum plans implies 
high levels of capital investment from both parties ($1,005 
from the landlord and #7)785 from the tenant). In landlord's 
Table 12. Tenant's optimum farm plans under the typical crop-share lease, 1955 
Farm 
plans & Total Landlord's Tenant's Total Landlord's Tenant's Rota- Limit-
capital capital capital capital return return return tion Hogs calves ing 
optima (dollars) (dollars) (dollars)(dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (acres) (litters)(no.)resources 
1 8,788 1,005 7,783 9,130 14,309 14,821 159 ccsbj 214 0 Capital 
H.H.a 
2 9,098 1,068 8,030 9,527 14,580 l4,9l7 168 ccsbj 214 0 Capital 
H.H. 
Land 
3 9,5714 1,068 8,506 9,735 li,580 5,155 168 ccsbg 2I4 1» Capital 
H.H. 
Land 
1» 10,837 1,387 M50 10,0314 14,623 5,1,11 168 ccsb^ 21» 8 Capital 
H.H. 
Land 
Com 
5 11,199 1,387 9,812 10,083 14,623 5,1460 168 ccsb^ 22 H» Capital 
Land 
Com 
Hay 
aH.H. s Hog housing 
Figure 8. Optimum farm plans for the tenant in a typical crop-share-cash 
lease under variable capital restrictions 
10,000 — 
S.OOO 
< G,000 
2,000 
2,000 
HOGS. 
CCSb 
4T 
CCSb IT 
CALVES 
H 
I—1 
H 
-L 
10.000 12.000 
Table 13. Landlord's optimum plans under the typical corp-share lease, 1955 
Farm 
plans & Total Landlord's Tenant's Total Landlord's Tenant's Rota-
capital capital capital capital return return return tien Hogs calves Limiting 
optima (dollars)(dollars) (dollars)(dollars)(dollars) (dollars) (acres)(litters)(no.) resources 
1 3,129 29I4 2,835 1,180 3,382 769 168 ccom^ 0 0 Capital 
Land 
2 k,bl9 717 3,702 6,0146 14,210 1,835 168 ccsb2 0 0 Capital 
Land 
3 5,2146 1,068 14,178 6,720 14,580 2,1140 168 ccsb. 0 0 Capital 
Land 
U 5,9h5 1,387 14,558 6,773 1,623 2,150 168 ccsb, 0 0 Capital 
Land 
Figure 9» Optimum farm plans for the landlord in a 
typical crop-share-cash lease under vari­
able capital restrictions 
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optimum plans, vice versa * before reaching such a level of 
capital investments there are two plans requiring only §294 
(P^) and 1717 (Pg) from the landlord. This would explain 
the relatively small amount of capital (around #500) contrib­
uted in practice by the landlord under the typical crop-
share-cash lease. The contrast between landlord's and ten-
ant1 s requirements of capital throws light on the conflicts 
between the parties of the lease which have been pointed out 
in the delimitive phase of the analysis. It is evident now 
that the small quantities of landlord's capital sufficient 
to arrive at landlord's first and second capital optima are 
too restrictive for tenant's first optimum plan. 
In order to compare more closely and to formulate sug­
gestions about the optimum proportional contributions of 
capital by both parties, the levels of capital requirements 
associated with tenant's and landlord's optimum plans have 
been graphed in Figure 10. The quantities of landlord's 
capital are represented on the horizontal axis and those of 
tenant's capital on the vertical axis. The capital to be 
contributed by each party according to landlord's and ten­
ant's optimum plans are plotted forming two capital require­
ment curves. Each curve specifies the quantity of capital 
that the other party has to contribute in order to achieve 
a specified capital optimum. The capital optima are labeled 
Figure 10. Landlord's and tenant's capital requirement 
curves for respective optimum plans in a 
typical crop-share lease 
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a specified capital optimum. The capital optima are labeled 
as in the previous figures with subscripts specifying land­
lord's and tenant's optima. For example, Pg%, refers to the 
second capital optimum for the landlord, while P^ indicates 
the fifth capital optimum for the tenant. The space above 
the landlord's capital requirement curve indicates feasible 
amounts of tenant's capital, while the space below contains 
cuantities too restricting to achieve the landlord's optimum. 
Analogously, the space to the right of the tenant's capital 
requirement curve includes feasible quantities of landlord's 
capital whereas the quantities to the left of the curve are 
insufficient for tenant's optimum plans. It becomes possi­
ble, on the basis of the capital requirements of both par­
ties to determine the respective quantities of capital which 
would eliminate conflicts in the use of operating capital 
within the farm. As indicated by Figure 10, the capital as­
sociated with P^ permits the achievement of P^ and P^T; 
similarly the quantity of landlord's capital required by 
?4L permits the attainment of P^T and P^^. Both P-^ and 
Pg^ would become sources of conflict between the landlord 
and the tenant because of the amount of landlord's capital 
too limited to attain even the first optimum plan of the ten­
ant. 
In conclusion, it appears that, given the level of tech­
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nology, quantities of fixed resources, level of management 
and prices expectations assumed in this study, in order to 
eliminate the infratemporal conflict between the two par­
ties in the typical crop-share-cash lease, the landlord's 
contribution of capital ought not to be inferior to the 
quantity required by Pyji (|l,068). Assuming that the land­
lord has to borrow the capital on the market, both plans 
would appear to be profitable since P^ and P4L give marginal 
net returns to capital of §1.08 and &.13 respectively. In 
practice these rates will be discounted for risk and uncer­
tainty but even then it is likely that both P and P^ would 
show profitableness for the landlord. 
The comparison between the efficiency of the typical 
crop-share lease with the owner-operated situation is per­
formed in a later section when all the alternative leases 
considered are compared symultaneously with the norm. 
Optimum farm plans under a modified 
crop-share lease 
A set of incentive conditions for attaining efficiency 
and equity has been advanced in the literature dealing with 
the problem of resource allocation in leasing arrangements. 
Of the four incentive conditions two deal specifically with 
the problem of infratemporal resource allocation. They state 
that : 
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1. The share of the factor of variable input 
must be the same as the share of output of 
product obtained from it. 
2. The shares of all products must be the 
same (25, p. 86). 
The empirical investigations dealing with these conditions 
have been restricted thus far to ascertaining the extent of 
their existence in representative types of leases. The 
previous sections of this study have indicated the impact 
on intrafirm efficiency when the division of costs and bene­
fits is not based on the above conditions. It is now of in­
terest to determine the effect on efficiency and sharing of 
income when these two incentive conditions are applied to 
the typical crop share lease.* 
Tenant's and landlord's optimum plans are presented in 
Tables 14 and 15 and illustrated graphically in Figures 11 
and 12. 
The modifications in the sharing rules engenders an 
agreement between the parties on the farm plans to be adopted 
even at low levels of capital. For the tenant, because of 
the reduced amount of capital he has to contribute to each 
crop enterprise, investment in livestock at low capital levels 
loses priority with respect to rotations and fertilizer. 
*A description of the specific arrangements of this 
modification is given in Table 4. 
Table lij. Tenant's optimumroplans under the modified crop-share lease, 1955 
Farm 
plans & Total landlord's Tenant's Total landlord's Tenant's Rota-
capital capital capital capital return return return tian Hogs Calves Limiting 
optima (dollars)(dollars) (dollars)(dollars)(dollars) (dollars)(acres)(litters)(no.) resources 
1 2,950 1,1475 1,1475 14,5314 2,267 2,267 168 csbcom^ 0 0 Capital 
Land 
2 3,1<60 1,730 1,730 5,151) 2,577 2,577 168 csbcomg 0 0 Capital 
Land 
3 1,1420 2,210 2,210 6,Oltl4 3,022 3,022 168 ccsb^ 0 0 Capital 
Land 
it 5,2W 2,62U 2,629 6,720 3,360 3,360 168 ccsb^ 0 0 Capital 
Land 
5 9,0146 2,6214 6,1,22 9,580 3,360 6,220 168 ccsbj 2h 0 Capital 
Land 
H.H 
• 6 9,501 2,62k 6,877 9,810 3,360 6,1450 168 ccsbg 2li 14 Capital 
Land 
H.H. 
Com 
7 10,737 2,972 7,765 10,135 3,386 6,7149 168 ccsb^ 214 8 Capital 
Land 
H.H. 
Cash 
aH.H. - Hog housing 
Table lL»« (continued) 
Farm 
plans & Total landlord's Tenant's Total landlord's Tenant's Rota-
capital capital capital capital return return return tion Hogs Calves Limiting 
optima (dollars)(dollars) (dollars)(dollars)(dollars) (dollars)(ac re s)(litters)(no.) resources 
8 11,071 2,972 8,099 10,259 3,386 6,873 168 ccsb, 22 lit Capital 
4 Land 
Hay-
Corn 
9 12,72*3 2,698 10,050 9,791 2,898 6,893 10 ccsb^ 7 52 Capital 
78 ccomr Land 
Hay 
Com 
May-June 
labor 
Table !£>• landlord's optimum plans under the modified crop-share lease, 1955 
Farm 
plans & Total landlord's Tenant's Total landlord's Tenant's Rota- Hogs 
capital capital capital capital return return return tion no. Calves Limiting 
optima (dollars)(dollars) (dollars) (dollars)(dollars (dollars)(acres)(litters)(no.) resources 
1 2,950 1,1(75 1,1*75 It,531* 2,267 2,267 168 csbcomi 0 
2 3,1*60 1,730 1,730 5,l5U 2,577 2,577 168 csbcom2 0 
3 l*,l*20 2,210 2,210 6,01*14 3,022 3,022 168 ccsbg 0 
1* 5,21*8 2,621* 2,621* 6,720 3,360 3,360 168 ccsb^ 0 
5 5,91*5 2,972 2,972 6,772 3,386 3,386 168 ccsb^ 0 
0 
Capital 
land 
Capital 
Land 
Capital 
Land 
Capital 
Land 
Capital 
Land 
Figure 11. Optimum farm plans for the tenant in a modified crop-share 
lease under variable capital restrictions 
RETURNS (DOLLARS)  
figure 12. Optimum farm plans for the landlord in a 
modified crop-share lease under variable 
capital restrictions 
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Investment in livestock takes place only when total capital 
has increased to ;,?9,046 (P^). The last plan, P^, involves 
a decrease in total return because the sizeable fall in land­
lord ' s return and the slight increment in tenant's income. 
This plan, however, is non profitable from the point of view 
of the farm as a unit, and it is likely that both parties 
will agree on adopting the proceding plan, Pp. 
The second impact is of the incentive conditions a de­
crease in every plan in the share of returns going to the 
landlord. This fall in landlord's income is accompanied by 
an increase in the proportion of capital he has to contribute. 
The capital requirement curves connected with this lease 
are presented in Figure 15. The first four optimum plans 
for both parties call for identical amounts of capital and 
the possibility of conflicts within the firm about the allo­
cation of capital to the fixed resources are thus eliminated. 
The fourth landlord's optimum plan provides sufficient 
capital to permit the achievement of tenant's fifth and sixth 
plan. Similarly, landlord's last plan (P^) corresponds to 
tenant's seventh and eighth plans. 
In conclusion, this modified crop-share lease eliminates 
the conflicts in allocation of resources present in a typical 
crop-share contract. It is unlikely, however, that a land-
Figure 13. Landlord*s and tenant's capital require­
ment curves for respective optimum plans in 
a modified crop-share lease 
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lord will be willing to adopt this lease because of 1) re­
duction of his income and 2) greater involvement in pro­
duction risk and uncertainty through an increase in his 
share of capital. Once high levels of capital have been 
reached, probably a livestock-share lease would appear con­
venient for the landlord. 
Optimum farm plans under a typical livestock-
share lease 
In a livestock-share contract the equal sharing of 
benefits and costs between the two parties of the lease is 
not limited to the crop enterprises but includes also the 
livestock activities which enter the farm plan.* 
This rental arrangement brings about a complete agree­
ment between landlord and tenant in the intratemporal allo­
cation of resources. The agreement exists at all capital 
levels, as indicated by the data in Table 16 illustrated in 
Figure 14. The selection of farm plans is identical to the 
one obtained under a situation of owner-operatorship. Cap­
ital investment in crop enterprises and fertilizer have 
priority over the livestock activities which enter the plan 
only when the total capital available is greater than $3,248. 
*8ee Table 4 for a description of the characteristics 
of this lease. 
Table 16. Tenant's and landlord's optimum plans under a typical livestock-share lease, 1955 
Farm 
plans & Total Landlord's Tenant's Total Landlord's Tenant's Rota-
capital capital capital capital return return return tion Hogs Calves Limiting 
optima (dollars)(dollars) (dollars) (dollars)(dollars) (dollars)(acres)(litters)(no.) resources 
1 2,950 1,1(75 1,1(75 lt,53lt 2,267 2,267 168 csbcomj 0 0 Capital 
Land 
2 3,It 60 1,730 1,730 5,l51t 2,577 2,577 168 csbcomg 0 0 Capital 
land 
3 it, 120 2,210 2,230 6,01,6 3,023 3,023 168 ccsbg 0 0 Capital 
Land 
It 5,21,8 2,62k 2,62b 6,720 3,360 3,360 168 ccsb^ 0 0 Land 
Capital 
5 9,01,0 It,523 It,523 9,580 It, 790 It, 790 168 ccsb^ 2li 0 Land 
Capital 
H.H.a 
6 10,600 5,300 5,300 10,361, 5,182 5,182 168 ccsbj 21 13 Land 
Capital 
H.H. 
Hay 
7 lit, 158 7,079 7,079 11,63I4 5,817 5,817 1,2 ccsb^ 
126 csbcomj 
2lt 50 Land 
Capital 
H.H. 
Corn 
Hay 
aH.H. - Hog housing 
Table 16. (continued) 
Farm 
plans & Total landlord's Tanant's Total Landlord's Tenant's Rota-
capital capital capital capital return return return tion Hogs Calves limiting 
optima (dollars)(dollars) (dollars)(dollars)(dollars) (dollars)(acres)(litters)(no.) resources 
8 35,000 7,500 7,500 11,822 5,911 5,911 33 ccsb3 2k 57 Land 
Capital 
H.H. 
Com 
Hay 
May-June 
labor 
9 15,206 7,603 7,603 11,861} 5,932 5,932 30 ccsbj, 2k 58 Land 
85 csbcom^ Capital 
52 ccom-3 H.H. 
Corn 
Hay 
May-June 
labor 
Figure 14. Landlord's and tenant's optimum plans in a livestock-share 
lease under variable restrictions 
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Hogs are the more profitable livestock enterprise up to 
#9,000 of capital. Beef cattle then enter the plan modi­
fying the crops combination because of the increased feed 
requirements. Finally, at further application of capital 
would not increase total return because the fixed resources 
(land, labor, and livestock building) become resteictive 
and only a change in their quantities would permit of ex­
pansion of output. 
Comparison between optimum plans under 
owner-operatorship and alternative leases 
The discussion in the previous sections has been focused 
on the conflict between the landlord and the tenant within 
a specified lease. In order to test the overall efficiency 
of the leasing arrangements considered here, the optimum 
plans of each party of a lease are compared with the plans 
attainable under owner-operatorship. For clarity of illus­
tration, the relationship between capital and returns for 
each situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 15. 
The figure indicates coincidence between optimum plans 
of owner-operatorship and livestock-share lease. The associ­
ation between benefits and costs guaranteed by the terms of 
the livestock-share lease eliminates the infratemporal in­
efficiencies connected with the sharing of inputs and outputs. 
The modified crop-share lease induces the optimum plans 
Figure 15. Optimum farm plana for alternative tenure arrangements under 
variable capital restrictions 
OWNER-OPERATOR AMD 
LIVESTOCK- SHARE LEASE 
OPTIMUM PLANS MODIFIED CROP-SHARE LEASE 
TENANT'S OPTIMUM PLANS 
MODIFIED CROP-SHARE LEASE 
LANDLORD'S OPTIMUM PLANS ^ 8,000 
TYPICAL CROP-SHARE LEASE 
5> TENANTS OPTIMUM PLANS 
<0,000 
TYPICAL CROP-SHARE LEASE 
~~~ LANDLORD'S OPTIMUM PLANS 
8,000 6,000 
CAPITAL (DOLLARS) 
of both parties to coincide with those of the owner-operator 
up to the point in which the livestock enterprises are intro' 
duced in the plan. In the last plans there is a reduction 
in efficiency as shown graphically by a deviation of the 
lines representing landlord's and tenant's optimum plans in 
modified crop-share lease from the owner-operator's curve. 
The deviation from the owner-operator curve is greater 
in the case of the typical crop-share lease. .At low levels 
of capital the inefficiency is particularly conspicuous; it 
decreases considerably when the amount of capital is in­
creased. Tangency with the owner-ope rat or1 s curve is at­
tained only at the third optimum plan for the landlord. 
The tenant's curve, even though it approaches the owner-
operator's curve, never achieves tangency because of the 
intrafirm cost transfers induced by the cash rent on hay. 
This comparative analysis, focused on efficiency, per­
mits 1) selection of the most efficient arrangements given 
certain restrictions on the amount of capital available, 
and 2) selection of optimum quantities of capital given a 
specific lease. The illustrations of these twofold ad­
vantages connected with the analysis are evident from the 
preceding tables and figures. 
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It is obvious, however, that efficiency both within 
and between leases, is not the only criterion to deter­
mine in practice the selection of a given rental contract. 
The sharing of income connected with each lease will def­
initely influence the type of contract that both landlord 
and tenant will be willing to accept. It is thus reason­
able to expect that the typical crop-share lease will not 
be easily abandoned by landlords because of the higher 
proportion of total return connected with it. This is 
particularly relevant at low levels of landlord's capital. 
The previous analysis, however, provides useful suggestions 
on the capital arrangements between parties even when the 
typical crop-share lease is maintained. At higher capital 
levels the livestock-share lease becomes more profitable 
to both parties and it is likely to be adopted. 
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SUMMAKÏ AND CONCLUSIONS 
The problems delimited for this study involve the 
effects of intratemporal resource use in farm leases upon 
intrafirm efficiency. The existence of deviations induced 
by leases from the pattern of resource allocation in the 
traditional theory of the firm has been the object of the­
oretical investigations in the literature. However, a com­
plete empirical testing of the propositions advanced in the 
theory is still lacking. The difficulty is mostly in the 
adoption of methodological procedure applicable to the test 
and measurement of efficiency at the firm level. In pre­
vious studies two techniques have been employed to this pur­
pose : 1) production function, and 2) linear programming. 
The former has been used to estimate and compare efficiency 
of resource use within farms operated under different tenure 
calssification. The estimates were obtained from samples 
of farms in a given year. The results showed the necessity 
of more precise knowledge about intra-tenure class variations. 
The latter has been applied to the study of tanancy showing 
the existence of lease induced conflicts between landlord and 
tenant in allocating farm resources. 
The basic objective o f  this study was to develop a 
methodological procedure which could be used to analyze the 
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impact of alternative tenure structures on intrafirm re­
source allocation. As an empirical application of the sug­
gested procedure the impact of leases on infratemporal al­
location of resources has been studied. T.7ith respect to the 
general purpose, the linear programming technique has been 
employed to attain the following objectives : 1) to isolate 
and describe factors affecting allocation of resources with­
in customary and modified farm leases, and 2) to advance 
preliminary propositions on the types of adjustments needed 
in rented farms in North Central Iowa, with respect to both 
types of leases given certain resources restrictions and 
resource combinations given certain leasing arrangements. 
Hypotheses Tested and Results Obtained 
The central hypothesis directing the empirical phase 
of the study was based on the theoretical proposition that 
a schism between the contribution of costs and receipt of 
returns within the firm might induce distortions in pro­
duction decisions with respect to the traditional theory 
of the firm. More specifically, four hypotheses were used 
to guide the empirical phases of the investigation. Brief­
ly, the hypotheses formulated were these : 
1. Provisions for sharing costs and returns in cus­
tomary share leases are causes of inefficient 
intratemporal allocation of resources. 
2. The quantity of operating capital contributed by 
the landlord and the tenant is a relevant factor 
in determining deviations from optimum resource 
use within a given lease. 
3. In a lease characterized by customary sharing of 
benefits and costs, increase in efficiency may be 
obtained through appropriate modifications in the 
quantity of capital contributed by the landlord 
and the tenant. 
4. The application of the optimum conditions of 
sharing benefits and costs needs to be accompan­
ied by a sizeable adjustment in the quantities 
of variable resources traditionally contributed 
by the two parties. 
To test the foregoing hypotheses, the linear program­
ming technique was employed to determine the optimum farm 
plans for infratemporal use of resources under owner-
operator ship and alternative leases. The simplex method of 
solution of a programming problem was modified to attain 
maximization of returns to the parties of the lease with the 
solution of one simplex tableau. This modified solution was 
employed to test the eventual presence of conflicts between 
the landlord and the tenant for a lease. The test was based 
on the specific assumption that both parties desire to maxi-
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raize their income from the use in production of a given 
bundle of resources. 
The modified simplex solution for linear programming 
with variable capital restrictions has been employed to 
determine the quantities of operating capital to be contribu­
ted by both parties under alternative leases. 
The analysis was conducted for quantity and quality 
of resources characteristic of a typical farm in North 
Central Iowa and specifically in Hamilton County. 
Test of hypothesis No. 1, about inefficiency in 
infratemporal allocation of resources in a 
typical crop-share-cash lease 
The efficiency of infratemporal allocation of resources 
in a typical crop-share-cash lease was tested through an 
ex-post analysis comparing production decisions and return 
attainable under owner-operatorship with those attainable 
under the typical rental contract. The optimum farm plan 
for an owner-operated situation was selected as the norm with 
which landlord's and tenant's optimum plans are compared. A 
set of efficiency conditions were set up to test efficiency 
in achieving the norm. A necessary condition calls for iden­
tity of landlord's and tenant's plan; a sufficient condition 
requires identity of both parties1 plan with the owner-
operator's program. 
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The ex-post analysis was performed for the period of 
years from 1951 to 1955. The results of the analysis showed 
that a typical crop-share-cash lease would not have met 
throughout the period, the efficiency conditions. First, 
in each year there was a discrepancy in total returns be­
tween the owner-operator optimum plan and the plans of both 
parties. Second, with the exception of 1952, landlord's 
and tenant's programs of resource use did not coincide ; 
areas of conflict of variable magnitudes were present. 
These results lead to the conclusion that if resources were 
allocated rigidly according to the provisions of a typical 
crop-share-cash contract, the utilization of the bundle of 
resources would be less efficient than under a situation of 
owner-operatorship. This is indicated by the fact that both 
landlord's and tenant's optimum plans leave some proportion 
of tenant's capital idle in consequence of the limited amount 
of capital contributed by the landlord. 
Landlord-tenant conflicts arise chiefly from the selec­
tion of the rotation and its level of fertilization. The 
landlord finds it most profitable to select the rotation 
and the fertilizer level which gives him the highest return 
for dollars invested. However, the customary amount of land­
lord capital does not permit, even under his limited share 
of cost, contribution of the amount of operating capital 
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needed to achieve the level of fertilisation which appear 
to be profitable for either the tenant or the owner-operator. 
On the other hand, the feeding requirements of the livestock 
enterprises induce the tenant to select the rotation and 
the fertilization level which best complement the livestock 
entering the plan. 
The ex-post analysis showed further a considerable 
amount of variability from year to year, in the degree of 
inefficiency and conflict between landlord and tenant. This 
is caused by changes throughout the period of several vari­
ables. They are : 1) size of contributions of operating 
capital by the two parties, 2) expectations of prices of 
the products, 3) items of costs of the potential enter­
prises. Given the sharing provisions of the typical lease, 
the above variables seem to affect decisively the agreement 
between the parties and the overall efficiency. 
The first hypothesis was essentially delimitative, in 
the sense of indicating the presence of inefficiency as a 
consequence of customary lease provisions. The following 
hypotheses were concerned with the impact of quantity of 
operating capital on the efficiency of typical and alterna­
tive leases. 
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Test of hypothesis No. 2, concerning the effect 
of operating capital on conflicts between 
parties and overall efficiency 
In North Central Iowa the customary composition of 
a crop-share lease requires the contribution of land and 
buildings by the landlord and of labor and machinery by 
the tenant. To this bundle of fixed resources operating 
capital is applied by both parties in proportions varying 
according to the specific rental agreement. It is obvious 
that sharing of operating capital and returns between the 
parties must become the crucial problem of infratemporal 
resource allocation. 
The analysis with respect to this hypothesis was pri­
marily an examination of the levels of marginal returns to 
operating capital in optimum plans of the owner-operator, 
landlord and tenant. The linear programming solution im­
puted prices to the restrictive resources. Comparison be­
tween the foregoing optimum plans showed sizeable varia­
bility in the marginal returns to operating capital, Under 
owner-operatorship operating capital was a restricting re­
source throughout the period ; the marginal net returns to 
capital varied from v.6? to %.% because of the changes in 
the quantity of capital available and prices of the products. 
In both landlord's and tenant's optimum plans, on the other 
hand, only the operating capital contributed by the landlord 
148 
appeared to be constantly restricting while portions of 
the tenant's capital lay idle. Returns to landlord's cap­
ital were therefore higher than returns to capital under 
owner-operator's optimum plans : they varied throughout the 
period from a maximum net return of S2.44 to a minimum of 
|.45. Besides, the allocation of landlord's capital ap­
peared to be a source of conflict between the parties of 
the lease since the return to each party from this re­
source varied drastically in moving from landlord's to 
tenant's optimum plan. 
The empirical findings determined for given leasing 
provisions the optimum amounts of operating capital to be 
contributed by the parties in order to eliminate conflicts 
stemming from the application of this variable resource to 
the bundle of fixed factors. This was performed in the 
empirical analysis connected with the third hypothesis. 
Test of hypothesis No. 3, about agreement between parties 
and increase in efficiency obtainable through appropriate 
contributions of capital by the landlord and the tenant 
in the typical lease 
The modified simplex solution for linear programming 
with variable capital restrictions was applied to deter­
mine and compare the plans corresponding to capital optima 
under landlord's and tenant's income maximizing solutions. 
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The analysis was performed for resources available in the 
typical farm in 1955 and expected prices for the same year. 
The comparison of optimum plans of the parties of the lease 
under variable capital restrictions lead to the determina­
tion of capital requirement curves. The curve of each 
party specifies the amount of capital to be contributed by 
the other party if a given optimum plan should be estab­
lished. The comparison of the landlord's and tenant's 
capital requirement curves defined the ranges of capital 
at which there is agreement between the optimum plans of 
the two parties. Given the assumed amount of fixed re­
sources, technical relationships and prices expectations, 
capital requirement curves showed that conflicts stemming 
from contribution and allocation of operating capital in a 
typical lease would be eliminated if landlord's input were 
not smaller than |l,068. At this level of landlord's cap­
ital agreement on rotation and fertilization level is 
achieved and two tenant's optimum plans are possible» The 
next landlord's optimum plan (calling for §1,587 of landlord 
capital) also permits the attainment of two tenant's op­
timum plans. Conflicts between parties related to resources 
allocation would thus be eliminated if the landlord increased 
the customary contribution of operating capital (around 
$500) to the minimum determined through the capital require-
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ment curves. On the basis of the assumed price relationships 
the increase in capital contribution would be convenient 
for the landlord since even at the maximum contribution 
(|l,387) one unit of capital would yield a net return of $.13. 
Fulfillment of the necessary condition for efficiency 
through adaptation of capital contributions does not guar­
antee achievement of the sufficient condition. In fact, 
comparison of tenant's optimum plans with the returns asso­
ciated with capital optima under owner-operatorship showed 
a slightly lower return in the former. This is caused by 
the presence of inter-enterprise cost transfers engendered 
by the distortion in cost structure associated with the pay­
ment of cash rent on hay. Modification in the lease pro­
visions, which are examined in the fourth hypothesis, are 
therefore needed if fulfillment of both necessary and suf­
ficient efficient conditions is sought. 
Test of hypothesis No. 4, about elimination of infra­
temporal inefficiency through application of incentive 
conditions to the sharing of costs and benefits 
In the analysis guided by this hypothesis, the effect 
of application of the incentive conditions for infratemporal 
efficiency to the share lease has been investigated. The 
modifications in the sharing provisions, calling for equal 
shares of variable inputs and of the products, bring about 
agreement between the parties on the farm plans to be adopted 
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even at low levels of capital. Identity is attained be­
tween the landlord's and the tenant's capital requirement 
curves thus fulfilling the necessary condition for effi­
ciency. In addition, the optimum plans of both parties 
coincide with the optimum plans for the owner-operator up 
to the level of capital at which livestock activities enter 
the plan. At this point the cash rent paid by the tenant 
on meadow and permanent pasture is again a cause of intra-
firm cost transfer and induces a distortion in the cost 
structure of the livestock enterprises resulting in decrease 
of efficiency. 
Finally, it was tested empirically that the applica­
tion of the incentive conditions not only to crop enterpris­
es but to all activities produced in the farm eliminates in­
efficiency stemming from lease provisions concerned with 
intratemporal resource allocation. Optimum plans charac­
terizing a livestock-share lease are in fact identical to 
those obtained when linear programming with variable cap­
ital restrictions is applied to a situation of owner-
operatorship. 
The entire analysis based on the above hypotheses was 
chiefly concerned with problems of efficiency in infra­
temporal allocation of resources, devoting secondary at­
tention to aspects of equity of income distribution. A 
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complete analysis of the equity of rental contracts would 
require considerations of alternative amounts of both 
fixed and variable resources. This phase of lease analy­
sis xvas beyond the scope of this study which was restricted 
to allocation of variable to fixed resources in one pro­
duction period. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
An expansion of the present study toward a more com­
prehensive treatment and analysis of efficiency and equity 
in alternative leases could proceed according to the fol­
lowing steps: 
1. Study the effect of variation in product prices 
on the overall efficiency and conflicts between the parties 
of the lease. The analysis of this factor would complete 
the analysis of infratemporal allocation of resources. Lin­
ear programming modified to allow variation in prices, would 
appear to be the suitable technique. 
2. Study the impact of leasing engendered intertempor­
al conflicts on efficiency and equity. This area of investi 
gation is broad and complex including problems stemming 
from tenure uncertainty and allocation of resources over 
time. Methodological procedures should be deviced before 
proceeding to the empirical testing. Dynamic programming 
could probably represent a useful tool of investigation in 
this area. 
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3. Study the appropriate combinations of fixed re 
sources contributed by the landlord and the tenant. Lin­
ear programming with variable resource restrictions could 
be also usefully applied here. Only at this segment of 
the analysis can efficiency of resource allocation and 
equity of income distribution be looked at with complete 
perspective. With the background of the previous phases 
it should be possible to determine the optimum size of the 
farms under various forais of tenancy, thus arriving simul­
taneously at equitable and efficient arrangements. 
4. As a final step, the institutional analysis of 
rental contracts should be connected with their economic 
analysis. In other words, provisions which are rooted in 
custom and tradition may be evaluated in economic terms. 
This would mean to provide landlords and tenants with ac­
curate and complete information about the economic sacri­
fice involved when customary rental provisions are adopted. 
The parties involved could then arrive at decisions on the 
various aspects of the lease operating in a framework of 
knowledge more precise than the one presently available. 
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APPENDIX A. MODIFIED SIMPLEX SOLUTION TO 
DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM PLAN IN A RENTED FARM 
In order to arrive at the determination of optimum. 
plans for landlord and tenant with a single programming 
solution, a modification to the simplex solution has been 
introduced. Table 17 contains a schematic presentation of 
the modified simplex tableau. Since the purpose of the 
table is exclusively illustrative, only the iterations es­
sential for the understanding of the procedure have been 
included. 
In the initial iteration the only difference with re­
spect to the usual tableau is the division of the rows on 
the basis of the resource contribution by landlord and tenant 
to each activity and to the total resource supply. For ex­
ample, in Table 17 the row of operating capital, which is 
the only resource to be contributed by both landlord and 
tenant in the lease under consideration, is divided into 
the landlord capital row and the tenant capital row (P-^%, 
and P^rp, respectively). Similarly, the net income rov) 
(Zi-c. ) has been divided into the landlord and tenant net 
J J 
income rows (Z.-c._ and Z.-c respectively). 
J J ii J J 3-
To solve the matrix, the tenant net income row is 
chosen as the vector to be maximized and the activity with 
the largest negative net price becomes the incoming activity 
Table 17. Schematic presentation of a simplex solution modified to determine optimum plans 
for a rented farm3 
Itera­
tions 
?16T 
*Ï8 
% 
Resource 
Disposals Activities 
?0 % p16L F16T . . .  % p%... P5 . . .  Pp.. .  P33 
160 1 0 0 0 3 It 5 0 0 
625 0 1 0 0 6.62 6.62 10.92 0 0 
6175 0 0 1 0 60.03 59.07 72.44 161.38 137.44 
1680 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70.4 0 
57 0 0 0 0 0 -1.0 -1.9 .81 1.6 
0 0 0 0 1 —36 —62.06 —63.6 125.85 50 
0 0 0 0 0 -23. 49 -22.69 -40.22 79.72 -41.56 
0 0 0 0 0 -57.83-57.83 -92.86 0 0 
V%0 10.61 
P3 .75 ^05 
lb 3U.90 
Pia 262.07 
X % 64.03 
P13 20.H1 
z.-cj r  3376.19 1.56 .1*3 .46 -,oU 5.59 11.19 3.23 0 2k.00 
zj-CjL 3583.69 -1.16-1.11 .72 -.93 1.20 12.56 .1*9 0 53.00 
tjj - .76—2.58 —22.73 
aThe symbols relating to resources and activities (Bj) are illustrated in Table 18. All 
the figures have been rounded to two decimals. The check rows and columns have been omitted. 
Table 17• (continued) 
Resource 
Itéra- supply Disposals Activities 
tlons po *1$ P16L pl6T**e p25 ?%*"* p9eee p13 ^ i EI  ^
?2 37.76 
xi % 
2t;i 
Pl3 20.01* 
Z1-°1T 3375.53 1.25 .20 .1*9 0 6.23 12.80 3.99 0 26.33 
Z1"C1L 3598.59 5.99 4.22 0 0 -13.25 -24.21 -16.77 0 0 
- 2.13 - 1.89 - 4*20 
— _ nog 
P£ç 80,92 
P2 47.53 
Pl8 298.63 
XII P24 47.73 
Pi-D 19.62 
%i=c 3361.63 -.45 .61 .49 0 3.73 8.73 0 0 26.33 
z%-c:, 3657.04 13*14 2.48 0 0 -2.74 -7.11 0 0 0 
£. 3 - .72 - .81 
ft 3.42 
F&5 151.58 
P2 48.78 
P18 308.19 
XIII fJu 47.71 
PÏ3 19.48 
Z4—C4J 3331.77 «"4.10 1,50 .49 0 -1.64 0 —8.57 0 26.33 
zjj-CjL 3681.36 16.11 1.76 0 0 1.63 0 6.98 0 0 
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(PJJ in the attached example, since -79*72 is the largest 
negative net price in the tenant's row). I'he solution pro­
ceeds as in the standard simplex method until all the ele­
ments of the tenant's net income row have become positive 
(Iteration x in Table 17). This indicates that the tenant, 
who has been the decision maker, has selected the plan 
which will maximize his income. During this first phase 
of the solution, the landlord net income row has been car­
ried along, as any other row, but has never been taken into 
consideration inddeciding what enterprises to bring into 
the plan. Hence, it might happen that enterprises with neg­
ative net prices still exist in the landlord's row. This 
indicates that a readjustment of the plan, either with the 
introduction of different enterprises or the modification 
of the level of intensity of those now composing the plan, 
would increase the landlord's returns. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the movement from the 
tenant's to the landlord's optimum combination of enter­
prises may proceed along different paths according to the 
selection of the enterprise to be introduced in the following 
iterations. However, we are particularly interested in 
those intermediary positions between the two optima which 
form the upper boundary of the feasible combination of enter­
prises in the landlord-tenant income plane. An initial 
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Table 18. List of activities and resources with correspond­
ing symbols used in the simplex solution 
Items Symbols 
Activities 
ccsb-L 
ccsbg 
ccsb% 
ccsbj. 
ccom^ 1 
ccomg 
ccom? 
ccorn^ 
csbcom^ 
csbcom2 l 
csbcom? 
csbcom^ 
Spring hogs 
Pasture-fed calves 6 
Resources 
Land 
Capital 
Landlord capital 
Tenant capital 
Cattle housing 
Hog housing 1 
Labor group A 
Labor group B 
Labor group C 
Labor group D 
Labor group E 
P19 1? 4! 
Hay 
Corn p24 25 
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approximation of the relevant boundary may be obtained in 
introducing in the intermediary iterations between the ten­
ant's and the landlord's optimum plans, the enterprise 
which involves the maximum increase in landlord's income 
for each unit of tenant's income given up. To this purpose, 
a new row is introduced (q. ), whose elements are obtained 
by dividing the negative landlord's net price coefficients 
by the corresponding coefficients in the tenant's row. The 
largest ratio will indicate the incoming activity, which will 
increase landlord's income and at the same time induce the 
minimum decrease in tenant's income. In Table 17, -22.73 
is the largest ratio in iteration % and therefore Pg^ be­
comes the incoming activity. In iteration XI landlord's 
total net income has increased (from ^ 3,583 to l?3,5/8) 
and tenant's income very slightly decreased (from $3,37& 
to v3j375). The same criterion is followed in selecting 
the incoming activities in iterations ZI and XII (-4.20 
and -O.ÔÎ are the largest ratios). Finally, in iteration 
XIII all the coefficients of the landlord's net income ro"w 
have become positive thus indicating that the combination 
of enterprises and their intensities which maximize land­
lord's net income has been selected. Naturally, in going 
from iteration X to iteration XIII, that is from tenant's 
net income maximizing plan to landlord's net income maxi­
165 
mizing plan, some tenant's net price coefficients will 
change from positive to negative. This indicates that the 
matrix opens the possibility of moving back to the optimum 
position specified by iteration X. However, the collection 
of points so obtained does not necessarily guarantee cir­
cumscription of all the feasible points between the tvo 
optima. The correctness of the boundary nay be checked 
through the introduction of alternative profitable enter­
prises moving from the tenant's optimum position and in 
the following intermediary points. This trial and error 
procedure explores the possible oaths of movement from ten­
ant's to landlord's optimum and thus tests the correctness 
of the boundary traced previously. ''Jith reference to Table 
17, the check is performed by introducing in iteration XI 
(-1.18) and P]_£ (-1.11) and then exploring all the 
alternatives stemming from the introduction of these two 
enterprises. The computational procedure is the standard 
one and therefore these iterations are not included in 
Table 17. 
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APPENDIX B. INPUT-OUTPUT DATA FOR CROP ENTERPRISES 
The labor requirements for the crop considered in this 
study and the costs associated with their production are pre­
sented in the Tables 19 through 23. 
The labor requirements have been assumed to remain un­
changed during the period considered in the analysis. The 
labor coefficients for the rotations included in the study 
can be easily deduced summing the requirements of the crops 
composing one unit of rotation. 
The items of the capital coefficients have similarly 
been presented on a crop basis. Therefore the requirement 
of operating capital of each rotation is obtained by summing 
the costs attached to each component crop. 
In the programming dealing with leases the capital 
coefficients of landlord and tenant for each rotation are 
computed by summing landlord's and tenant's contribution as 
specified by the rental contract, For example, in the typi­
cal crop-share lease landlord's capital coefficient of a 
rotation of corn-corn-soybenas at the second level of fertil­
ization is obtained by adding: 1) half of the fertilizer 
expense, 2) half of the corn seed expense, and 3) the en­
tire expense for soybeans seed. The tenant's coefficient is 
computed analogously. 
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Table 19. Monthly labor requirements of crops per acre, 
in man-hours3 
Months Corn Oats Soybeans Meadow*3 
January 0 0 0 0 
February 0 0 0 0 
March 0 .355 0 0 
April .826 .895 .60 0 
May 1.540 0 1.44 0 
June .917 0 .90 0 
July .749 1.875 . 66 4.520 
August 0 1.875 0 3.850 
September .140 0 .18 0 
October 1.036 0 1.86 3.250 
November 1.428 0 .36 0 
December .364 0 0 0 
Total 7.00 5.00 6.00 11.62 
Unpublished data from Ross Baumann, Department of 
Economics and Sociology, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. 
The monthly coefficients do not include labor for fertili­
zing. For fertilization: add 0.1 hour per acre in May 
and June for corn; add 0.3 hour per acre in April for oats; 
and add 0.2 hour per acre in May for soybeans. These 
coefficients have been assumed to remain unchanged during 
the period considered in the analysis. 
^Assumes all hay harvested and yield of 2.5 tons per 
acre. 
Table 20. Costs per acre for corn, years 1951-1955, dollars3 
Itema Unit 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Tractor overhead 
Tractor operating 
Machinery overhead 
Seed 
Building repair 
Total constant cost 
Harvesting 
ê/ac. 2.60 
$/ac. 2.92 
S/ac. 6.23 
Vac. 2.00 
$/ac. 2.99 
$/ac. 16.74 
f • . .06 
2.60 2.63 
2.92 2.97 
6.23 6.30 
2.00 2.00 
2.99 3.00 
16.74 16.90 
.07 .07 
2.66 2.68 
3.01 3.06 
6.45 6.61 
2.00 2.00 
3.02 3.02 
17.14 17.37 
.08 .13 
aThese costs are estimates of those expenses normally required to seed and cultivate corn 
with the average technique used in the area. Fertilization costs are not included} they can be 
obtained by multiplying the fertilization rates given in Table 2 for the fertilizer prices 
given in Appendix D. With the addition of the fertilizing expense the items composing the 
capital coefficient for corn are complete. These data are adapted from Bowlen and Heady (3). 
Table 21. Costs per acre for oats, years 1951-1955, dollars8 
Items Unit 1951 1952 1953 1951 1955 
Tractor overhead 
Tractor operating 
Machinery overhead 
Seed 
Building repair 
Total constant cost 
Harvesting 
$/ac. 2.69 
S/ac. 1.50 
#/ac. 4.12 
l/ac. lo86 
$/ac. 2.43 
$/ac. 12.60 
#/bu. .01* 
2.69 2.72 
1.50 1.53 
1*.12 4.24 
1.98 1.58 
2.1*3 2.50 
12.72 12.57 
.01* .04 
2.75 2.77 
1.55 1.57 
4.30 4.37 
1.58 1.58 
2.50 2.51 
12.68 12.60 
.05 .08 
aThese costs are estimates of those expenses normally required to seed and cultivate oats 
with the average technique used in the area. Fertilization costs are not included; they can be 
obtained by multiplying the fertilization rates given in Table 2 for the fertilizer prices given 
in Appendix D. With the addition of the fertilizing expense the items composing the capital 
coefficient for oats are complete. These data are adapted from Bowlen and Heady (3)* 
Table 22* Costs per acre for soybeans, years 1951-1955, dollars3 
Items Unit 1951 1952 1953 1951 1955 
Tractor overhead 
Tractor operating 
Machinery overhead 
Seed 
Building repair 
Total constant cost 
Harvesting 
$/ac » 2.59 
S/ac. 2.86 
$/ac. 5.33 
S/ac. 4.92 
$/ac. 1.47 
%/ac. 17.17 
l/bu. .04 
2.59 2.62 
2.86 2.86 
5.32 5.40 
4.20 4.30 
1.55 1.55 
16.52 16.73 
.04 .04 
2.65 2.67 
2.88 3.00 
5.55 5.65 
4.45 4.63 
1.55 1.56 
17.08 17.51 
.05 .08 
aThese costs are estimates of those expenses normally required to seed and cultivate soy­
beans with the average technique used in the area. Fertilization costs are not included; they 
can be obtained by multiplying the fertilization rates given in Table 2 for the fertilizer 
prices given in Appendix D. With the addition of the fertilization expense the items composing 
the capital coefficient for soybeans are complete# These data are adapted from Bowlen and 
Heady (3). 
Table 23* Costs per acre for meadow, years 1951-1955, dollars0 
Items Unit 1951 1952 1953 195k 1955 
Tractor overhead $/ac. 2.60 2.60 2*63 2.65 2*68 
Tractor operating S/ac* 2*99 2.99 3.05 3.10 3.13 
Machinery overhead l/ac* k.8k k.8k lu90 k.95 5.1k 
Seed Vac* k.08 k.56 1.62 k.2k 6*k2 
Building repair Vac* 2.83 2*83 2.83 2.83 2.83 
Total constant cost Vac* 17.3k 17*82 18*03 17.77 20.20 
Harvesting S/ton k.67 k.87 k.90 k.9k k.9k 
aThese costs are estimates of those expenses normally required to seed and cultivate an 
alfalfa-red clover-timothy meadow with the average technique used in the area* Fertilization 
costs are not included $ they can be obtained by multiplying the fertilization rates given in 
Table 2 for the fertilizer prices given in Appendix D* The harvesting cost is not included in 
the capital coefficient of the rotations but it is charged to the livestock engerprises under 
the assumption that in the eventual absence of livestock the hay would not be harvested* Those 
data are adapted from Bowlen and Heady (3)» 
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APPENDIX C. INPUT-OUTPUT DATA OF 
LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES 
The input-output data for the livestock enterprises 
considered in this study are presented in Tables 24 and 
25. "Tith the exception of the capital coefficients, the 
input requirements have been assumed to remain unchanged 
during the period under analysis. 
The data presented in Tables 24 and 25 refer to the 
enterprises produced under a situation of owner-ope rat ors hip. 
In a crop-share-cash lease the cash rent paid on meadow 
and permanent pasture would be added to the capital co­
efficients. 
Table 24. Input-output data for spring hog enterprise, 1951-1955, on a litter 
basis3 
Items Units 1951 1952 1955 1954 1955 
Operating capital13 dollars 159. 18 l6o. 85 162. 60 161.57 159. 90 
Housing sq. ft. 70. 40 70. 40 70. 40 70.40 70. 40 
Labor man-hours 26. 00 26. 00 26. 00 26.00 26. 00 
January it H 1. 48 1. 48 1. 48 1.48 1. 48 
February ii » 1. 48 1. 48 1. 48 1.48 1. 48 
March ii it 7. 02 7. 02 7. 02 7.02 7. 02 
April n » 99 . 99 . 99 .99 # 99 
May ii ii 99 . 99 . 99 .99 e 99 
June II ii 2. 16 2. 16 2. 16 2.16 2. 16 
July ii ii 2. 16 2. 16 2. 16 2.16 2. 16 
August ii ii 1. 69 1. 69 1. 69 1.69 1. 69 
September ii rt 5. 17 5. 17 3. 17 3.17 3. 17 
October ii n 1. 48 1. 48 1. 48 1.48 1. 48 
November ii ii 1. 69 1. 69 1. 69 1.69 1. 69 
December ii ii 1. 69 1. 69 1. 69 1.69 1. 69 
Hay tons # 81 81 # 81 .81 • 81 
Corn and equipment bu. 125. 85 125. 85 125. 85 125.85 125. 85 
aThe data have been obtained from the records of the Farm Business Associa­
tion for the selected farm in Hamilton County. The labor coefficients are those 
adapted by Mackie (28). The data refer to the enterprise produced under a situa­
tion of owner-operatorship, under tenancy. The quota of cash rent paid on hay is 
added to the capital coefficient. 
bThe items composing the capital expense are: protein, power, equipment, 
miscellaneous. 
Table 25. Input-output data for pasture-fed calves enterprise, 1951-1955, 
on a head basis® 
Items Units 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Operating capital*5 dollars 106.77 120.26 131.74 116.76 120.41 
Labor man-hours 
1.08 January » n 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 
February ii ii 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
March ii ii 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
April 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 
May » ii 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 
June ii n 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 
July n ii 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 
August ii ii 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 
September ii ii 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 
October ii ii 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
November ii ii 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
December n ii 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 
Hay tons 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 
Corn and equivalent bu. 50 50 50 50 50 
aThe data have been obtained from the records of the Farm Business Associa­
tion for the selected farm in Hamilton County. The labor coefficients are those 
adopted by Mackie (28). The data refer to the enterprise produced under a situa­
tion of owner-operatorship; under tenancy the quota of cash rent paid on hay is 
added to the capital coefficient. 
bThe items composing the capital expense are: protein, power, equipment, 
miscellaneous, feeder stock and hay harvesting cost. 
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APPENDIX D. PRICES USED IN PROGRAMMING 
The prices of the crops and livestock enterprises 
used in programming are presented in Table 26. 
It is assumed that the price expectation models do 
not vary in the alternative tenure situations considered. 
The prices of crops correspond to the arithmetic mean of 
the prices occurred in the previous 10 years ; the length 
assumed for the expected prices of livestock is five years. 
Only products prices are given here. The prices of 
inputs such as feed, fertilizer, etc., may be found in 
the agricultural statistics literature. 
Table 26. Prices of crops and l ivestock enterprises used in programming, 
1951-1955 
Items Units 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Crops 
Corn 
Oats 
Soybeans 
Livestock 
Butcher hogs 
Sows 
CaIves 
dollars/bu 
h n 
1.08 
.69 
2.29 
dollsrs/cwt 18.93 
" " 16.93 
" " 16.90 
1.19 
•75 
2.36 
19.52 
17.52 
20.44 
1.26 
.78 
2.47 
18.12 
16.12 
22.85 
1.30 
•77 
2.56 
17.62 
15.62 
8 2 . 9 8  
1;P 2.60 
18.68 
16.68 
22.76  
